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This dissertation argues that the desire satisfaction theory, arguably the dominant
theory of well-being at present, fails to explain why depression is bad for a person.
People with clinical depression desire almost nothing, but the few desires they do have
are almost all satisfied. So it appears the theory must say these people are relatively welloff. A number of possible responses on behalf of the theory are considered, and I argue
that each response either fails outright, or requires modifications to the desire satisfaction
theory which make the theory unattractive for other reasons.
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1.1 Introduction
This work explores one problem for what may be the most popular theory of wellbeing at present, the desire satisfaction theory.1 A theory of well-being is an attempt to
give an account of what it means to live a good life. The desire satisfaction theory says,
roughly, that having a good life is a matter of getting what you want. Less roughly, it
says that getting what you want, or “desire satisfaction,” is the only thing which is good
for you and is always good for you, and not getting what you want, or “desire
frustration,” is the only thing which is bad for you and is always bad for you. A person’s

1

Daniel Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 34.
According to Haybron, “the theory to beat is the desire-fulfillment theory of well-being.” I
follow Haybron in referring to the view as simply the “desire theory” for the sake of concision.
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level of well-being can therefore be determined simply by looking at how many of their
desires are satisfied. The more of their desires are satisfied, the better they are doing.
An advantage of this theory over its rivals is its flexibility in what sort of life it
allows to count as a good life. Since people can desire almost anything, almost any type
of life can count as good, according to the theory. All that matters is that the person
living that life is getting what they want. Rival theories of well-being either make
something good for a person even when they do not want it, or they fail to take into
account a person’s unique interests in explaining what is good for them (or both). For
example, according to hedonism about well-being, a life goes well to the extent that it
contains pleasure. Most people think pleasure is part of a good life. But some people
may want other things instead. A dedicated scientist or athlete may desire a life high in
achievement in their field, even if this life involves less pleasure than a life low in
achievement. Hedonism says that a life of high achievement and low pleasure is always
worse than a life higher in pleasure but lower in achievement. The desire theory,
however, allows that the life of the dedicated scientist or athlete can be a good life even
when those lives are low in pleasure because the people living them are getting what they
want. At the same time, a life high in pleasure and low in achievement can also be a
good life, on the desire theory, as long as that is what they desire. This shows that the
desire theory is more flexible than other theories in what kind of life it counts as a good
life.
This same flexibility is also a problem for the theory, however. Some lives are
bad lives even when the person living it seems to be getting what they want. For
example, an addict may be uninterested in getting help for her addiction. A member of a
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religious cult who has been brainwashed may claim there is nothing about his life he
would want changed. Intuitively, these peoples’ lives are not going well. But because
they are getting what they want, the desire theory seems committed to saying their lives
are going well.
The desire theorist has three ways of responding to such counterexamples. The
first is to argue that standard versions of the theory can explain why the person in the
purported counterexample is not living a good life. The desire theorist may argue, for
example, that despite appearances, the addict is not really getting what she wants (or is
getting less of what she wants than if she were not an addict) , and so the theory can
explain why her life is not going well. The second type of response is to revise the desire
theory in a way that avoids the problem. This may involve, for example, adding to the
desire theory a non-standard condition which rules out desires that are the product of
addiction. The third type of response is to bite the bullet and accept that, in the purported
counterexamples, the person is getting what they want, but argue that we were wrong to
think it is a bad life.
The best response for the desire theorist will depend on the details of each
counterexample. In the cult member case, for example, the best response may be to bite
the bullet, while in the addict case, the best response may be to argue that the desire
theory has the resources to explain why that life is bad. Because the details matter, each
counterexample must be considered on its own. Some may be easily dealt with because
the theory straightforwardly explains away the problem, or the bullet is not a big one to
bite.

4

This work explores a counterexample to the desire theory like the two discussed:
the life of the clinically depressed person. Depressed people generally lack desires for
things which nevertheless seem to be good for them, like friendship and future happiness.
They stop going to work, attending social functions, bathing and cleaning, and getting out
of bed. They stop eating and drinking, and in some cases they stop moving altogether
(catatonic depression).2 They stop doing these things because depression has eliminated
their desire to do them. The few desires they do have are easily satisfied. They desire to
sleep and to avoid seeing others, for example, and they do these things. So despite
having almost no desire to do anything, or because of this fact, they appear to be getting
nearly everything they want. As in the previous two examples, since the desire theory
says a person’s life is going well to the extent that they are getting what they want, the
theory seems committed to saying the depressed person is living a good life. But this
seems wrong. They are not living a good life.
I focus on the case of depression because, though similar to the other
counterexamples mentioned, it is an especially difficult counterexample to respond to.
Standard versions of the desire theory do not seem able to explain why the depressed life
is bad. The bullet in this case seems like a big one to bite, making that response
unattractive. And while revisions to the theory may solve the problem, it is unclear how
drastically the theory would have to be revised to deal with the problem.
In this chapter, I discuss the case of depression and try to make clear why it poses
a problem for the desire theory. In subsequent chapters, I explore ways the desire theorist
can respond to the problem. In doing so, I largely ignore the bullet biting response,
2

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders: DSM-5, (Arlington: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 119, 120, 186.
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though I say a few words later in this chapter to highlight the costs of making this
response. Thus, subsequent chapters focus on exploring different ways of making the
first two responses. Later in this chapter, I will introduce some standard versions of the
desire theory, and Chapter 2 is devoted to exploring ways the desire theorist can respond
to the problem of depression by showing that the badness of being depressed can be
explained by these standard versions. The third chapter looks at ways the theory could be
revised to avoid the problem. Since some ways the theory can be revised may involve
giving up on aspects of the theory which make it attractive, it will be important in that
chapter to consider the consequences of these revisions. For this reason, in the next
section of this chapter, I look briefly at some of the desire theory’s chief attractions.3

1.2 Well-being, Subjectivism, Objectivism, and Hybrid Theories
1.2.1 Well-being
a. The concept. Before moving on, a few clarifications about the topic of wellbeing are important. First, a theory of individual well-being is a theory about what makes
a person’s life go well or badly for them. Several terms are commonly used as synonyms
for ‘well-being.’ When we are concerned with an individual’s well-being, we are
concerned with their ‘welfare,’ ‘happiness,’ ‘prudential good,’ and ‘quality of life.’ If we
wished to know about a person’s level of well-being, we might ask how well they are
doing, how good their life is, whether they are living a good life, or whether they are
happy. It may seem that at least some of these terms have different meanings. A
3

The standard theory/revised theory distinction is a somewhat artificial one, since there are really only
more and less radical departures from the historically popular versions of the theory. I rely on the
distinction primarily because those who are familiar with the literature on desire theory tend to naturally
see some responses to objections as working within the theory and other responses as being revisions to the
theory.
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flourishing life, for example, may seem to involve more than mere happiness. However,
I will follow convention by using these terms to refer to the same concept as ‘well-being’
refers.
These different ways of referring to well-being may give some idea of what a
theory of well-being is supposed to be a theory of, but it would be helpful to say more
than this. First, a prudentially good life should be distinguished from other ways a life
can have value. Stephen Campbell lists seven kinds of non-prudential value that a life
can have.4 Of these, I will mention only three. A life can be impersonally good or good
simpliciter when one’s life makes the world contain more value. A life can make the
world contain more value but be bad for the person living it. A person’s aesthetic or
scientific achievements could, on some views, add value to the world but the person
responsible for those achievements could live a bad life despite or because of those
achievements. So a life that is good for the world should be distinguished from a life that
is good for the person living that life. A life can be morally good when it is filled with
morally good actions or with virtue. But doing the right thing can involve making
personal sacrifices. So a morally good life is not the same thing as a prudentially good
life. Finally, a life can be perfectionistically good when the person living it fulfills or
perfects their nature. But it is at least not a conceptual truth that being good at what you
are designed to do is both necessary and sufficient for living a good life.
It may turn out that one or several of these other types of good lives overlap with
the prudentially good life. A prudentially good life may require that one be a morally
good person. It could even turn out that the prudentially good life just is the morally

4

Stephen M. Campbell, “An Analysis of Prudential Value,” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 25,
no. 3 (2013): 335–36.
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good life. But if true, this would be a discovery and not something we are justified in
assuming from the outset. Keeping these different kinds of good life apart in our minds
is important when theorizing about the nature of well-being. Several philosophers have
recently argued that the intuition many people have about Nozick’s experience machine
example—namely, the intuition that the experience machine life is not to be preferred
over a slightly less pleasant real life—results from our focusing on the absence of nonprudential values in the experience machine life.5 By asking us which life we prefer, the
question allows that we might prefer a real, non-machine life because it would lead to
more non-prudential goods, like moral goods, than the machine life. This problem with
the experience machine thought experiment and the lessons we are supposed to draw
from it is the result of not paying attention to the difference between prudential goods and
other kinds of goods.
Similar problems may arise for the case I intend to focus on in the present work. I
am counting on the reader to have the intuition that the depressed person in the sorts of
cases I describe is not living a good life. But even if the reader has that intuition, the
intuition may result from focusing on ways a depressed life can lack other sorts of value
besides prudential value. This would be a problem for my argument if, once these nonprudential values were screened off, we had the intuition that the depressed life is not a
prudentially bad life. For example, depression may seem bad in the cases I describe
because it blocks the creation of moral and aesthetic value, rather than because of any
effect it has on a person’s well-being. If that’s right, the depression case would not be a
counterexample to the desire theory.

5

For a defense of this objection, see Joseph Mendola, “Intuitive Hedonism.” Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 128, no 2 (2006): 449-451.
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b. Intrinsic value. Theories of well-being start by attempting to construct a list of
things which contribute to and detract from a person’s welfare. Things that contribute to
welfare are said to be good for a person or have “prudential value,” and things which
detract from well-being are bad for a person or have “prudential disvalue.”6 Ideally, the
list will not contain things which are valuable only because they are a means to obtaining
or bringing about other prudential values. Money is an example of something like this.
Although having money improves your life, it is not because having it, by itself, is good
for you. It is good for you only because it allows you to buy things which make your life
better, such as food and shelter, among other things. Even food and shelter may have
only instrumental value. Having those things is good for you because having them is
essential to getting other things that are good for you. Things which are good for you in
themselves, regardless of what they can be used to get, are said to have “intrinsic value,”
and theories of well-being are concerned with identifying these.7 A list of intrinsic values
might include “love,” “knowledge,” “freedom,” or “pleasure.” Having these things in
your life, by themselves, make you better off.
One might wonder why theories of well-being are not also concerned with
determining what things are needed to effectively get what has intrinsic value. Questions
about the best way to get bring about a good life, such as whether it is better to find a
6

For the sake of brevity, I will ignore disvalue in the remainder of this section and mention only value, but
the discussion can be understood to be about both.
7
This way of describing the distinction runs together several distinctions which some prefer to keep apart.
Some prefer to contrast “intrinsic” with “extrinsic” value, and to contrast “instrumental” with “final value”
or “ultimate” value (See Christine M. Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” Philosophical Review 2
(April 1, 1983): 169–96.) The intrinsic/extrinsic value distinction is about whether an object is valuable in
virtue of intrinsic properties of the object or extrinsic properties, whereas the instrumental/final value
distinction is about whether an object is valuable as an end or as a means to some other valuable end.
Sentimental attachments, like an old ring, may have final extrinsic value because the object has value only
because of its relationship to something else.
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practical career or to do what you love, are important questions. But, just as figuring out
the quickest way to get somewhere cannot begin until one knows where they are going,
practical questions about the most effective way of achieving the good life require first
knowing what the good life is. Theories of well-being attempt to answer this more basic
question.

c. Theories of well-being. Much of the literature on well-being is devoted to
defending views about what is intrinsically good for a person—what things are good for a
person independently of what else they contribute to a person’s life. For example,
hedonism says that pleasure is the only thing on the list of prudential goods,8 whereas the
desire theory says that the satisfaction of one’s desires is the only thing on the list. But to
be useful, a theory of well-being should tell us more. For the things which the theory
says have intrinsic value, the theory must tell us whether all instances of those things
have the same value, or whether the presence or absence of certain other properties
modulate the value of those objects. Some hedonists hold that more intense pleasures
have more value than less intense pleasures. Similarly, desire theorists sometimes hold
that the satisfaction of a stronger desire is more valuable than the satisfaction of a weaker
desire (though they disagree about what makes one desire stronger than another).
Instances of pleasure or desire satisfaction which are produced in the wrong way, such as
being based on false information, may have no value at all on some theories.
In addition to telling us what is intrinsically good and bad for us, a theory of wellbeing ought also to tell us about how to use this information to determine a person’s level
8

Shelly Kagan has recently spawned renewed debate about whether hedonism is a form of value monism
or pluralism because of differences between pleasure and pain (Shelly Kagan, “An Introduction to Illbeing,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 4 (2014): 261-288).
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of well-being. It should tell us how well off a person is both at a time and during an
interval of time, including an entire life. Making this determination may seem
straightforward once we have the list of intrinsic goods. It may seem merely to be a
matter of adding up the value present in a person’s life at a time, and then summing those
values across time to get the value of an interval of time. But there are different ways of
approaching this question of measurement. As we will see in chapter 3, these differences
in approaches to measurement sometimes depend on details of a particular theory. In
other cases, the differences cut across theories. One example is whether the distribution
of intrinsic goods across a person’s entire life is relevant to determining a person’s
welfare at a time. “Holistic” approaches to measurement differ from the simple picture
of measurement just mentioned in that well-being at a time depends on more than just the
amount of intrinsic goods present in the person’s life at that time. According to holistic
theories, other facts about a person’s life, such as at what stage in their life they get
certain goods, affect how much value those goods contribute.9

1.2.2. Subjectivism, objectivism and hybrid theory
As mentioned, some responses to the problem of depression involve making
revisions to the desire theory. These responses may succeed in avoiding the problem, but
at the cost of giving up features of the desire theory which make it attractive in the first
place. Therefore, it is worth spending a few moments to look at what some these
attractions are.

9

For a recent defense of a version of holism, see Dale Dorsey, “The Significance of a Life’s Shape,”
Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 125 no. 2 (January 2015): 303–
330.
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The desire theory is a version of subjectivism about well-being, and the main
attractions of the desire theory of well-being are the main attractions of subjectivist
theories about well-being more generally. To understand what these attractions are, it is
necessary to first understand what distinguishes subjectivist theories from their
alternatives: objectivist views and so called “hybrid theories.” According to
subjectivism about well-being, a thing is good for a person just when and because that
person has a pro-attitude toward it. Pro-attitudes are favoring attitudes toward an object,
such as liking, valuing, wishing, and desiring. Objectivist views hold that some things
are good for a person even when that person lacks a pro-attitude toward it. The ‘because’
in the definition of subjectivism should be understood as a grounding or explanatory
relation between the fact that a person has a pro-attitude toward an object and the fact that
it is good for them. This relation is taken to be essential to the distinction between
subjectivism and its alternatives.10 Without it, the subjectivist view would say that a
thing is good for a person if and only if that person has a pro-attitude toward it. But
consider an objectivist view which holds that only x, y and z are valuable, and suppose it
turns out that, necessarily, everyone always and only intrinsically desires x, y and z. This
objectivist view would count as subjectivist because everything on its list is desired and
everything desired is on its list. But subjectivists and objectivists would disagree over
why those things are on the list. Though important, for the sake of simplicity, I will leave
out the “because” part of the formulation of subjectivist views in what follows, letting it
be implicit.

10

As Sobel puts the point, “What defines an account of well-being as subjective is the thesis that an agent’s
desires ground what makes something good for her…subjectivists claim that the relevant sort of desire
grounds, not merely tracks, the truth of claims about what is good for a person.” (David Sobel,
“Subjectivism and Idealization,” Ethics 119 (January 2009): 336–37.)
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We can therefore understand a view to count as subjectivist if it says that having a
pro-attitude toward an object is both necessary and sufficient for it to be valuable. I will
refer to the necessity of a pro-attitude for a thing to count as valuable as the ‘necessity
condition’ and the sufficiency of a pro-attitude for a thing to count as valuable as the
‘sufficiency condition.’

Necessity Condition: For any subject S and any object x, x is good for S only if S
has a pro-attitude of type A toward x.

Sufficiency condition: For any subject S and any object x, if S has a pro-attitude
of type A toward x, then x is good for S.

A view counts as objectivist if it denies both the necessity and sufficiency
conditions. Hybrid views about well-being are said to occupy a middle ground between
objectivism and subjectivism. They occupy this middle ground by endorsing either the
necessity condition or the sufficiency condition, but not both. An example of the
“sufficiency version” of the hybrid theory would be one which held that anything desired
is thereby good for a person, but pleasure is good for a person even when it is not desired.
An example of the “necessity version” of the hybrid theory would be a theory which
holds that knowledge, pleasure and virtue are the only things intrinsically good for
person, and good for a person only when desired. The necessity version of the hybrid
theory has become virtually synonymous with “hybrid theory” in the literature on wellbeing because, unlike the “sufficiency version,” it is thought to have all the advantages of

13

subjectivist and objectivist theories without the disadvantages. I will follow this
convention and henceforth use “hybrid theory” to refer to the necessity version unless
otherwise noted.

1.2.3 Two Advantages of Subjectivism
We can turn now to the advantages and disadvantages of subjectivism. These can
largely be understood as advantages or disadvantages of meeting or failing to meet the
necessity and sufficiency conditions. Let’s begin with the advantage to a theory of
meeting the necessity condition. Theories which meet this condition have the advantage
of avoiding making what is good for a person alien to them. How, it is asked, can a thing
be good for a person if it leaves them completely cold, or fails to “resonate” with them in
any way? A life can only be a good life for a person if the person living it is not
completely alienated from it. Subjective theories and hybrid theories satisfy the necessity
condition, and so ensure that what is good for a person is not alienating to them.
Objectivist theories fail to meet the necessity condition, and thereby have the result that a
good life for a particular person could be one they do not find attractive.
The idea that a theory of well-being ought to make what is good for a person
attractive to them is known as the “resonance constraint”:

Resonance constraint: an adequate theory of well-being must not make what is
intrinsically good for a person something they cannot find attractive.11

11

To my mind, the term “resonance constraint,” which has also been used to describe a similar constraint
on the existence of reasons, is a misnomer, since “constraint” suggests a generally accepted condition on
what counts as an adequate theory. But objectivist theorists will not accept this condition. Perhaps better
would be “resonance intuition.”

14

I will not defend or criticize this condition. But it is worth noting that, if the
resonance constraint is to be used as an argument in favor of subjectivist and hybrid
theories and against objectivist theories, as it has been, more must be said about why such
an argument does not simply beg the question against objectivist theories. After all,
saying that a person does not or cannot find an object attractive seems to be another way
of saying that that person lacks a pro-attitude toward it.
In virtue of meeting the sufficiency condition, subjectivist views have a second
advantage. Because this condition says that my having a pro-attitude toward an object is
sufficient for it to be good for me, theories which meet this condition form the list of
what is good for a person around that person’s perspective. Dale Dorsey claims that this
feature of subjectivist views is “one of the primary advantages of subjectivism.”

Subjectivism is able to explain the seemingly plausible connection between what
a person values for his or her own sake and what is valuable for him or her for its
own sake. As noted by Richard Arneson, subjectivism is characterized, and in part
motivated, by the plausible thought that a person should be sovereign over his or
her good—his or her evaluative perspective (at least under the right conditions)
should determine his or her well-being.12

12

Dale Dorsey, “Subjectivism without Desire,” Philosophical Review 121, no. 3 (2012): 409.
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Similarly, Jennifer Hawkins writes that subjectivism “…is committed to what I
shall call the authority of the individual’s evaluative perspective.”13 These authors
emphasize that an important attraction of subjectivist theories is not merely that they
require that you care about what is good for you (resonance), but that you are sovereign
or have authority over what counts as good for you. Theories which do not meet the
sufficiency condition may be described as “paternalistic,” in the sense that they pay little
or no attention to person’s perspective in determining what is good for them. We can
refer to this advantage of subjectivist theories as the “anti-paternalism” advantage:

Anti-paternalism: a theory of well-being ought to respect an individual’s
perspective by giving that person significant authority over what sort of life
counts as good for them.14

An objectivist theory does not have this advantage because it fails to take into
account an individual’s pro-attitudes in determining what is good for them. Unlike
objectivist theories, hybrid theories do take an individual’s perspective into account to
some extent by requiring that person have a pro-attitude toward what is supposed to be
good for them. But the extent to which a person’s perspective is relied on is minimal. A

13

Jennifer Hawkins, “The Subjective Intuition,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 148, no. 1 (2010): 62.
14
Anti-paternalism is formulated in terms of what makes a life go well, rather than which things are good
for a person, whereas the resonance constraint is formulated in terms of what things are good for a person.
This is because the examples which motivate anti-paternalism tend to be about whether lives going well or
badly, whereas examples which support the resonance constraint tend to be about whether a thing counts as
good for a person. For whatever reason, people seem to have a stronger intuition that a thing must resonate
with a person for it to be good for them than that anything a person has a pro-attitude toward ought to count
as good for them. This asymmetry could belie something important about the nature of these advantages,
but since I only intend to give a rough account of these two advantages, I see no reason to try to question or
eliminate it.
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hybrid theory could claim that the only thing good for anyone is a connection with god.
Being a hybrid theory, it would not insist that having a connection with god is good for a
person if they are not interested in having such a connection. So it takes their perspective
into account by allowing them to veto a good if they do not care about it. But this veto
involves the most limited kind of authority over what is good for a person because the
rest of that person’s desires are irrelevant to what is good for them. Theories which meet
the sufficiency condition, by contrast, give the person what might be called legislative
authority over what is good for them. Such theories allow a person, in virtue of their proattitudes, to add things to the list in addition to taking them off.
It might be pointed out that subjectivist theories do place restrictions on what proattitudes count. For example, a common version of the desire theory holds that only the
satisfaction of rational desires is good for a person. One could imagine an especially
strict version of a desire theory which allows only the desire for a single object to be
good for a person. And one could imagine a very “permissive” hybrid theory which has
virtually infinite things on its list of goods. It might therefore be thought that subjectivist
theories are, in principle, no less paternalistic than hybrid theories. But the difference
between subjectivist theories and hybrid theories, in this respect, is that subjectivist
constraints on which pro-attitudes count do not require that a person desire any particular
end. Subjectivist constraints are designed to ensure that a person is truly getting what
they want.15 If the constraints go beyond this purpose—if they are designed to ensure
that a person has a pro-attitude toward some particular end—that view is not a
subjectivist view.

15

Sobel, David, “Subjectivism and Idealization,” Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and
Legal Philosophy 119, no. 2 (2009): 343.
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This difference between subjectivist views and hybrid views may make the antipaternalism advantage seem insignificant, since the very strict subjectivist view just
described has a narrow conception of the good life while the very permissive hybrid view
has a very inclusive conception. But, first, the purely theoretical advantage of
subjectivism is in where it places power. It is roughly the same advantage a democratic
political system is thought to have over an authoritarian one—an advantage which can be
appreciated even if, in practice, the democratic system is much more restrictive than the
authoritarian one. Second, most plausible subjectivist theories will not be the very strict
view, permitting only a single object to be desired. And most hybrid theories will likely
not be like the very permissive one described above, since the main attraction of hybrid
views over subjectivist views is that they get to limit what counts as good for a person.
To summarize, subjectivism and hybrid theories have the advantage over
objectivist theories of meeting the resonance constraint—of making sure that the good
life for a person is not one they find repulsive. In addition, subjectivist theories have the
anti-paternalism advantage over both hybrid and objectivist theories—the advantage of
giving the individual the authority to determine what is good for them. As mentioned,
the desire theory is a version of subjectivism, and is therefore thought to have these two
advantages, as well. Awareness of these advantages will be important when, in Chapter
3, we consider ways of revising the desire theory, as some revisions may require giving
up on one or both advantages.

1.3. Desire Theory
1.3.1. General formulation
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So far, I have only offered a rough characterization of the desire theory—that it
says that a life goes well for the person living it to the extent that they get what they want.
There are many ways this rough characterization can be made more precise. The aim of
this work is to explore whether the desire theory can avoid the problem of depression,
and part of this exploration involves looking at different ways the desire theory can be
spelled out to see whether, on any of these ways, the problem can be avoided. For this
reason, it will be useful to begin this exploration with a basic definition of the desire
theory—one that is precise enough to be useful in the discussion that follows, yet neutral
enough that it does not presuppose anything controversial among desire theorists.16
First, the desire theory should be understood to be saying that what is intrinsically
good for a person is to be getting what they intrinsically want, and what is intrinsically
bad for a person is to not get what they intrinsically want. To say that someone
intrinsically wants something, or has an intrinsic desire for it, is to say that they want it at
least in part for its own sake, rather than because getting it will promote the satisfaction
of their other desires. When one wants something because getting it will promote the
satisfaction of other desires, that desire is an instrumental desire. An example of an
instrumental desire is a desire to have dental surgery. In most cases, the reason one wants
dental surgery is to have healthy teeth or to avoid future pain. A desire can be both
intrinsic and instrumental, such as the desire to have a meaningful job. One might
intrinsically desire to have a meaningful job in part because having this job will lead to
the satisfaction of other desires they have, such as the desire to provide for their family.
But one might at the same time desire a meaningful job for its own sake. While some
16
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19

desire theorists defend the view that the satisfaction of merely instrumental desires
contributes to a person’s well-being, this view is not popular. So, I will say that the
general formulation of the desire theory holds that only the satisfaction of intrinsic
desires is good for a person.17
There is also disagreement about what counts as the object of a desire.18
According to one view, the object of desire is a concrete object, such as a banana split.
According to an alternative view, the object of desire is a state of affairs or a proposition,
such as my eating a banana split or that I eat a banana split. There does not seem to be a
standard view to take on this issue among desire theorists, but since much of the present
work involves discussion of desires and their objects, in order to be consistent I will
speak of the object of desire as being a state of affairs. We can say, then, that a desire
counts as satisfied if, and only if, the state of affairs desired obtains. A desire is
frustrated if, and only if, the desired state of affairs fails to obtain.
Another question which a desire theory must answer is how a desire satisfaction is
to be valued. Does the satisfaction of desires with certain properties have more value
than the satisfaction of desires without these properties? Here, I will make two
assumptions. The first is that the value of a desire satisfaction is determined by its
“intensity” such that the more intense a desire, the more valuable its satisfaction (I remain
neutral on what it is that makes one desire more intense than another). The second is that
the value of a desire is determined by its duration, so that the satisfaction of a desire
17
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which one has had for a longer amount of time than a second desire thereby counts as
more valuable, other things being equal.19
The fact that desires and states of affairs occur both at times and across times
makes the value measurement question more complicated. One important question is
whether a desire and its satisfaction must co-occur for the desire satisfaction to have
value. A second question is when we should say a person is benefited by a desire
satisfaction: when the desire exists, when the satisfaction occurs, or atemporally.20
These questions presuppose an answer to the non-evaluative question when a
desire counts as satisfied. If I want a French fry today, but I get it tomorrow, after I have
lost the desire, does my desire count as satisfied or frustrated? It is important not to
confuse this question with the question of the value of a desire satisfaction.21 There is
room for disagreement, here. But I think the correct answer requires recognizing that we
sometimes desire that things happen at times and that things happen when we desire
them. For example, I might desire that I have a French fry within the next hour. This
desire would not be satisfied if I got it this evening. But I might also desire that I get a
French fry at some point in my life. This desire would be satisfied if I got a fry this
evening. I also may desire that I get a French fry at some point in my life so long as I
desire it when I get it. This conditional desire would not be satisfied if I got a fry this
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evening when I no longer wanted one.22 Most desires for food are likely conditional
desires like this one, but many desires are not. I can desire to have published a novel
without wanting it to happen at any particular time and without caring whether I happen
to still desire it when it happens. This shows that my desire and the object I desire need
not co-occur for my desire to count as satisfied.
A more controversial and more relevant question is whether my desire and its
satisfaction must co-occur in order for that desire satisfaction to count as good for me.23
“Concurrentism” is the view that they must co-occur for a desire satisfaction to be
valuable, and “non-concurrentism” is the view that they need not co-occur for it to be
valuable.24 While concurrentism is defended by some desire theorists, it is not standardly
part of the view, and for this reason I will be assuming a non-concurrentist version of the
desire theory.

1.3.2. Standard versions
There are several important lines of disagreement among desire theorists about
which desire satisfactions matter. The lines of disagreement are either about which types
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of desire matter or about which type of satisfaction matters. The discussion of the
problem of depression that follows will involve exploring ways these modifications or
precisifications of the general version of the desire theory could solve the problem.

Which desires matter
a. Actual vs informed and rational desires. On one version of the desire theory,
the only desires relevant to a person’s welfare are their actual desires. On an alternative
to this view, the desires relevant are the desires they would have if informed and rational.

b. Global vs global+local desires. Global desires are desires about how one’s life
as a whole goes, or desires about how a part of one’s life goes when considering one’s
life as a whole. An example of a global desire would be the desire that my life contains
artistic creativity. Local desires are simply non-global desires. On a global desire theory,
only the satisfaction of global desires is good for you. On the alternative theory, both
types of desire satisfaction (global and local) are good for you.25

c. Self-regarding vs any-regarding desires. Self-regarding desires are desires for
an object in some sense about oneself. An example would be your desire that you not be
in pain. A non-self-regarding desire would be a desire for an object in some sense not
about oneself. An example would be a desire that your child be happy. Some versions of
the desire theory hold that only the satisfaction of self-regarding desires is good for a
person, while others have no such restriction.
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What satisfactions matter
d. Mental state vs world state. Finally, desire theorists disagree about whether the
desired state of affairs must actually obtain for a person to benefit, or whether it is
enough that the desirer simply believe that the state of affairs obtains (even if it doesn’t
actually obtain).26

1.4. The Problem of Depression
The problem of depression mentioned in the first section can be stated fairly
simply. To reiterate the simple statement of the problem, desire theories claim that a
person is well-off to the extent that they are getting what they want. People who suffer
from clinical depression want almost nothing, but the few desires they do have, such as to
lie in bed and to avoid contact with others, are satisfied. The desire theory thus seems
committed to saying that these depressed people are relatively well-off, or, at least, not
badly off. But this seems wrong. Such depressed people are not well-off.

The Problem of Depression
1. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent that they get what they
want.
2. Depressed people want almost nothing, but are getting what they want.
3. So, desire theories entail that depressed people are relatively well-off.
4. But depressed people are not relatively well-off.
5. So, desire theories are false.
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This simple statement of the problem must be made more precise, however, as it
can be taken to be pointing out one of several independent problems for desire theories
related to depression. The first is an instance of the problem of defective desires.
Defective desires are desires which are such that their satisfaction appears to some to
have no prudential value. Desires thought to be defective include “artificially aroused”
desires, such as those produced by advertisements or brainwashing, “pointless” desires,
such as the desire to count blades of grass, “base” desires, like the desire to do shoot
heroin, “irrational” desires—desires which, if satisfied, would frustrate more important
desires, and “self-undermining” desires, such as the desire to be badly off. 27 Because the
desire theory places no substantive restriction on which desires count, it is committed to
saying that the satisfaction of these defective desires is intrinsically good for a person.
The problem of depression could be construed as a problem about defective desires since
depression leads depressed people to desire things which seem to either have no value or
be bad for them. Depressed people often desire to avoid social contact, to stay in bed all
day, and in some cases to commit suicide. This way of understanding the problem of
depression simply points out that the satisfaction of these desires is not good for a person.

The Problem of Defective Desires (DD)
1. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent that they get what they
want.
2. Some depressed people want only to do things such as commit suicide or avoid
contact with others (defective desires).
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3. So, according to desire theories, the satisfaction of these desires is intrinsically
good for them.
4. But the satisfaction of these desires is not intrinsically good for them.
5. Therefore, desire theories are false.

I believe that suicide is often bad for people, and that the desire theory fails to
explain why it is bad for them. But I think the defective desires argument is not the best
way to understand why it is bad for them, and so it is not the best way to understand the
problem of depression. The reason DD fails is that the desire theorist can reply that the
badness of satisfying these desires is not intrinsic but instrumental. That is, these desires
are “defective” in that satisfying them frustrates ones other desires. This is compatible
with viewing their satisfaction as having intrinsic value, however. The reason we think
suicide is bad for a person is because it is instrumentally disvaluable. This is what we
ordinarily take to be bad for a person about their death. Death is bad for a person (when
it is) because it deprives a person of many things that would make their life valuable.
This type of response is the same one used against other defective desires
arguments. For example, we may be reluctant to say that the satisfaction of the desire to
torture an innocent person could be good for the torturer, but the desire theorist will point
out that our intuition in this case is being driven by the bad effects of immoral desires on
others and perhaps also by the bad effects on the torturer. But satisfying that desire is, in
itself, good for them. In a similar way, the desire theorist can respond to DD by saying
that committing suicide or laying around all day are intrinsically good for the depressed
person if they want them, but satisfying these desires frustrates their other desires, and so
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is instrumentally bad for them. If enough of these other desires are frustrated, it is also
all-things-considered bad for them.
One might point out that this response to DD fails because the depressed person
lacks other desires that would be frustrated by the satisfaction of these desires. Satisfying
the desire to commit suicide would not be instrumentally bad for them, because no other
desires are being frustrated. I am inclined to agree that the response fails for this reason.
But the desire theorist might say that it is unclear whether it is psychologically possible
that anyone have only one desire. Most depressed people seem to at least have several
desires, even when they desire suicide, and these desires may be frustrated by committing
suicide. This would leave it unclear whether satisfying that desire is all-thingsconsidered bad for them. For this reason, I will focus on a different way of understanding
how depression poses a problem for the desire theory. That is, I will not understand the
problem of depression as a defective desires problem.
As I will understand it, the problem depression poses for the desire theory is with
the theory’s claim that desire satisfaction is all there is to living a good life. As
mentioned, depressed people seem to be getting nearly everything they want, despite or
because they want almost nothing. Yet they are not living a good life. Even if we take
the satisfaction of the few desires they do have to be intrinsically good for them, their life
is still not a good one because important things are missing—things the depressed person
happens to no longer care about. In this sense, the problem for the desire theory is not
that depressed people want things that are bad for them but that they do not want things
that are good for them.
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The Problem of Missing Desires (MD)
1. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent they are getting what they
want.
2. Some depressed people want almost nothing, but are getting what they want.
3. So, according to desire theories, nothing could make them better off than they are.
4. But there are things which could make them better off than they are.
5. Therefore, desire theories are false.

Like the problem of defective desires, the “missing desires” problem for the
desire theory is a general one, and the problem of depression is an instance of this
problem.28 There are other cases which show that there is more to a good life than
getting what you want. Like the case of depression, these cases involve lives with easily
satisfied desires but which seem to be lacking something important. The lives of the
couch potato, the pot head, and the sex addict seem lacking in well-being, not because the
objects of their desire are problematic, but because their lives are missing something
important. While these other counterexamples are worth thinking about, I believe the
case of depression is unique in several respects. First, depression seems unequivocally
bad for a person, whereas the other lives just mentioned may appear to some to have
redeeming qualities. Some may also have a less strong intuition that the lives just
mentioned are bad lives. They may even, at times, see these as good lives. Second, I
think the problem of depression is immune to some of the responses which may be made
successfully against the problem presented by these other cases. For example, the couch
28
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potato may simply lack information which, if they had it, would lead them to desire other
things. As I argue in the next chapter, the same cannot be said about many cases of
depression.
So far, I have been speaking generally about cases of depression. But depression
comes in many forms and degrees of severity, and I do not think all cases of depression
pose a problem for the desire theory. Standard versions of the desire theory seem
straightforwardly able to handle certain depression cases. Mild depression may leave
intact nearly all of a person’s desires, but sap enough motivation to prevent them from
getting what they want. Depression harms them, but the desire theorist can explain why
in terms of the frustration of their other desires. Or take the example of a depressed
person who would come to have non-depressed desires if they had a little more
information. They would not be depressed if they had a more accurate appraisal of their
future prospects. The informed desire version of the desire theory, which says that it is
only the satisfaction of our informed desires which is good for us, could explain why
depression is bad for this person. Though this person actually lacks desires, the desires
they would have if informed are being frustrated by their inactivity.
The cases of depression which I think pose the most serious problem for the
desire theory are ones like that of Jane. Jane is a fictionalized version of an actual case
of a depressed patient described by psychotherapist Abraham Rudnick:

Jane: Jane is diagnosed with clinical depression, and understands that she is
depressed. She also understands that an effective treatment for her depression is
available. In other words, she understands that with treatment she would come to
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have the desires and the joys most non-depressed people have—in short, a normal
life. Nevertheless, Jane refuses treatment for her current episode of depression,
claiming that she does not care about the treatment outcome—she sees no point in
regaining the desire to live because she believes nothing is worth doing.29

If Jane has no desire either for the treatment itself or for any of the effects of that
treatment, it would appear that, according to desire theories, treatment is not good for her.
Yet, it seems evident that if anything is good for Jane, getting treatment is. What is
important about cases like Jane’s is that the depression could be effectively treated, and
yet the depressed person refuses treatment even though they understand that the treatment
would be effective. It is natural to think it would be good for Jane to get treatment
because she could go on to live a healthy, normal and happy life by most standards.
Once treated, she would be glad that she had gotten treatment. The tragedy of most
suicides resulting from depression lies in the fact that the person who died could have
gone on to live such a life.
Some might be skeptical about whether a case like Jane’s, as it is described, really
exists. They may wish to respond to the problem by arguing that all actual cases of
depression are like the one’s I dismissed as non-problematic. In subsequent chapters, I
will give evidence that such cases exist and are even quite common. A different sort of
skeptic, however, might ask why it matters to the problem of depression whether cases
like Jane’s exist, or whether they are common. Isn’t the mere possibility of a case of
depression like the one I’m describing sufficient for there to be a problem for the desire
29
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theory? I am concerned to show that such cases exist and are common because I think
that accepting the bullet biting response to the problem—the response which denies
premise (4) of MD

4. But there are things which could make them better off than they are.

—involves a greater intuitive cost if these cases of depression are actual and not merely
possible. This is because people tend to have much stronger intuitions about actual
cases—especially when these cases involve people we care about.

1.5. Dissertation outline
There are two basic strategies in responding to the problem of depression. The
first is to deny (4) of MD by arguing that the depressed person’s life is going well for
them. This “bullet biting” strategy seems to me so implausible on its face that I assume
most desire satisfaction theorists will opt for the second strategy. For this reason, I
devote relatively little space in the dissertation to exploring this strategy. The second
strategy is to deny premise (3).

3. So, according to desire theories, nothing could make them better off than they are.

Premise (3) is a sub-conclusion which depends on (1) and (2)
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1. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent they are getting what they
want.
2. Some depressed people want almost nothing, but are getting what they want.

Accordingly, there are two ways of denying (3). The first is to deny (2) by showing that
the depressed person has many desires, or would have many desires if informed and
rational, and these desires are not being satisfied.30 The second is to deny (1) by revising
or precisifying the desire theory in such a way that the depressed person does not count as
well-off.
Chapter 2 looks at a number of ways of denying (2). Each involves showing that,
despite their inactivity, depressed people do have many desires (or would have many
desires, if informed and rational) which are not satisfied. One way of doing this is to
argue that depression eliminates superficial desires, like the desire to go to work, but
leaves intact “deep desires,” such as the desire to have a fulfilling career, a desire to be
moral, or a desire for meaning. Eliminating the superficial desires results in the
frustration of deep desires, which explains why the depressed person is not doing well.
In response, I offer evidence that, in many cases of depression, these deep desires are also
eliminated.
A second way of denying (2) is to claim that only the desires a person would have
if informed and rational are relevant to their well-being, and the depressed person would
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have a normal range of desires if they were informed and rational. In response, I argue
that we have little reason to expect that, in all cases, information and rationality would
have this effect on a depressed person’s desires.
Chapter 3 considers ways of denying (1). One way of doing this involves
drawing a distinction between different ways of measuring well-being according to the
desire theory. A way of measuring, which I call the “fraction view,” holds that one’s
level of welfare is determined by the number of satisfied desires divided by the total
number of desires. A second way of measuring, which I call the “integer view,” holds
that one’s welfare is determined by the number of satisfied desires minus the number of
unsatisfied desires. An argument can be made that the problem of depression arises only
for the fraction view. However, I argue that the problem exists for the integer view, as
well. Another distinction can be drawn between a version of desire theory which holds
that only a person’s actual desires are relevant to how well-off that person is and a
version which allows that possible desires are relevant to well-being. An argument can
be made that the problem of depression arises for the first version but not the second. But
I argue that accepting this second view comes at the cost of forfeiting one of the
advantages the desire theory is thought to have over rival theories of well-being: antipaternalism.
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In this chapter, I look at a number of attempts to respond to the problem of
depression which involve arguing that the depressed person does have, or would have if
informed and rational, desires that could explain why they are not well off. Before
delving into each response, let me briefly try to explain, in general, how these responses
are supposed to avoid the problem. The problem of depression argument discussed in the
last chapter hinges on the claim (premise (2)) that, in some cases, the depressed person is
mostly getting what they want, and this is true because they have almost no desires at all.
The few desires they have, such as the desire to sleep or the desire to avoid social
interaction, are mostly satisfied most of the time. One could therefore respond to the
problem of depression by denying that they have only these few desires. This response
would involve showing that the depressed person has other desires which are being
frustrated. I will refer to these hidden desires as the “missing desires.”
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These desires are “missing” only in the sense that we have failed to take them into
account. This failure could be due to the fact that the existence of these desires has been
masked by the symptoms of depression. It could be that these desires are not masked, but
that we are uninformed about what depressed people are like. Perhaps my
characterization of the depressed person’s desires and their satisfaction is simply wrong.
Finally, it could be that we have failed to take into account desires because we have
misapplied the desire theory. For example, if, when properly understood, the desire
theory says that only the satisfaction of ideally rational desires is valuable, then it may
turn out that the depressed person has these counterfactual desires and those desires are
being frustrated.
The reason that showing these missing desires exist could solve the problem of
depression is that they are likely being frustrated by the symptoms associated with
depression, such as inactivity. Although the depressed person may be getting the few
obvious desires they have satisfied, the frustration of their hidden desires could explain
why they are not well-off. This requires showing that a) these hidden desires exist, b)
they are being frustrated, and c) the disvalue of the frustration of these hidden desires is
significant enough to explain why the depressed person is not well-off, in spite of the fact
that their obvious desires are being satisfied.

2.1 Actual Desires
A natural way of explaining the existence of the depressed person’s missing
desires is to appeal to their actual desires. This response would claim that the depressed
person has actual desires frustrated by their depression, and this desire frustration
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explains why their life is not going well. These actual desires would have to be desires
not eliminated by depression. The most plausible candidate is what Alan Goldman calls
“deep desires.” 31 These are things like a person’s life goals or major concerns—desires
to which the person who has them assigns a high priority and which give rise to many of
their instrumental desires. Examples of deep desires include a desire for financial
stability, desire that one has friends, moral desires, and desires for meaning. Following
Goldman, we can refer to non-deep desires, such as the desire to take a shower, as
“superficial” desires.
Empirical evidence for the existence of these deep desires will be discussed
below, and that evidence depends to some extent on which sorts of deep desires are being
considered. There may be evidence that the depressed person has moral desires, but not
desires for meaning, for example. But it is worth pointing out that a depressed person’s
inactivity is compatible with their continuing to have deep desires. When considering the
case of depression, we must not be too quick to assume from the depressed person’s
inactivity that they have lost all desires. But since the depressed person’s inactivity is
also compatible with the absence of their deep desires, we must also not be too quick to
assume those deep desires still exist. The matter must be settled by looking at the
empirical psychological evidence.
Having shown that the depressed person has deep desires, a desire theorist could
say that depression contributes to the frustration of these desires, and this explains why
their life is not going well. The depressed person who is unable to get out of bed is
thereby unable to take the necessary steps to maintain and advance their careers and
relationships with loved ones. They may have success in these areas for the moment, but
31
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their depression is destroying that success. For example, the depressed husband may still
desire that he remain married to his spouse for many years. But his present lack of a
desire to spend time with anyone, go to work, or even get out of bed will destroy his
marriage, frustrating his present desire to remain married.
The problem with this response is that empirical evidence indicates that, in many
cases, depression eliminates even these deeper desires. Of the criteria listed by the DSMV for a diagnosis of a major depressive episode, one of two criteria that must be met is
“markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day,
nearly every day”32 This suggests that depression involves a general loss of interest in
things, rather than the loss of merely superficial desires. Not only is the depressed person
unmotivated to shower or go to work, but they are also unmotivated to spend time with
friends and family and engage in leisure activities they once enjoyed.33 Depression is
common, with 11 million (4.5% of the population) adults in the U.S. in 2017
experiencing a major depressive episode with severe impairment.34 Since the criterion of
diminished interest just quoted is required for a diagnosis, one would expect that, among
these cases of major depression, there exist a significant number of cases of involving a
more extensive loss of interest than even “markedly diminished interest...in all, or almost
all, activities.” While suggestive, the evidence just presented does not rule out the
possibility that depression leaves some important deep desires intact. The next few
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sections consider various ways of arguing that the depressed person has these deep
desires.

2.1.1 Evaluative judgments
A good place to look for evidence of deep desires is in the evaluative judgments
made by depressed people. Judgments about what is good, worthwhile or important tend
to be an indication of what a person cares deeply about.35 The desire for friendship, for
example, is characterized by a disposition to spend time with friends and to get pleasure
from thoughts of having friends, but it is also accompanied by the judgment that it would
be good to have friends. Perhaps depressed people express judgments like that having
friendship is valuable, that not being loved is a bad thing, or that having success in their
career is a good thing. If so, we would have some evidence for thinking they also have
desires for these things.
Goldman argues that depressed people do continue to make such judgments. As
he points out, having negative evaluations of oneself is a common symptom of
depression.

Depression is not only compatible with the capacity for evaluation, but certain sorts of
evaluations lie at its core, namely negative evaluations of the self and of the possibility of
success in endeavors judged to be highly important and reflective of the self. Automatic
negative self-appraisals linked to desires for outcomes judged to be good but unattainable
contribute to depression.36
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According to Goldman, the negative self-evaluations made by depressed people,
such as that they are incapable of being loved or too incompetent to succeed in their
chosen field, provide evidence that they take certain states of affairs to be good. And the
fact that they take these states of affairs to be good is evidence that they have desires for
them.37
However, while it may be true that all depressed people continue to make
evaluative judgments, there is evidence that, in some cases of depression, these
judgments do not reflect the kind of deep desires which could explain why their life is not
going well. Some depressed people say that nothing is worth doing, that there is no
purpose or point in life, or that they feel empty.38 In an autobiographical account of his
depression, author Andrew Solomon says that, in his depression, “...the meaninglessness
of every enterprise and every emotion, the meaninglessness of life itself, becomes selfevident. The only feeling left in this loveless state is insignificance.”39 Computational
neuroscientist Walter Pitts writes, “I have noticed in the last two or three years a growing
tendency to a kind of melancholy apathy or depression. [Its] effect is to make the positive
value seem to disappear from the world, so that nothing seems worth the effort of doing
it, and whatever I do or what happens to me ceases to matter very greatly…”40 The
evaluative judgments expressed in these claims appear to reflect either an absence of
concerns altogether, or concerns of the wrong sort.
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On one interpretation of the quoted passages, these claims might appear consistent
with the picture suggested by Goldman according to which some valued and desired ends
are simply out of reach. On one interpretation of a claim like “every enterprise is
meaningless,” what is meant is that nothing they do will get them what they really want.
In other words, they have deep desires for some things, but believe no amount of effort
will bring these things about. However, other claims made by depressed people about
meaninglessness appear to be incompatible with this interpretation. In describing his
own battle with depression and suicide, Tolstoy writes that:

My life came to a standstill. I could breathe, eat, drink, and sleep, and I could not
help doing these things; but there was no life, for there were no wishes the
fulfillment of which I could consider reasonable. If I desired anything, I knew in
advance that whether I satisfied my desire or not, nothing would come of it. Had
a fairy come and offered to fulfill my desires I should not have known what to
ask…I could not even wish to know the truth, for I guessed of what it consisted.
The truth was that life is meaningless.41

What is noteworthy in this passage is that Tolstoy claims that he would not wish
for anything. Similarly, Maria von Herbert, in a correspondence with Kant in which she
describes her depression, writes that, “…I get an empty feeling inside that extends inside
me and all around me, so that I am almost superfluous to myself. Nothing attracts me,
and even getting every possible wish I might have would not give me any pleasure, nor is
there a single thing that seems worth the trouble of doing.”42
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These claims appear incompatible with an interpretation according to which
“everything is pointless” means “nothing I do will get me what I truly want” because
both Tolstoy and von Herbert maintain that there is nothing that they would wish for.
One would think that, if their lack of motivation to do anything were due to a belief that a
roadblock prevented them from achieving their goals, they would at least wish for that
roadblock to be removed.

2.1.2 Moral desires
Despite the evidence just presented, it might be argued that depressed people—
even those who judge life to be meaningless—still have deep moral concerns which are
being frustrated. Surely, it may be argued, depressed people do not stop caring about
their families, and they would surely choose to save a dog from cruel neglect if they
could so with minimal effort. Empirical evidence appears to support this hypothesis.
Those with depression experience empathy just as often, and to the same degree, as nondepressed people, and they tend to be even more concerned than non-depressed people
with how well they are meeting the requirements of morality.43 Perhaps when Tolstoy
and Von Herbert claim they could not wish for anything, what they mean is that they
could not wish for anything for themselves, but they could wish for things for others.
But Tolstoy, elaborating on the extent of meaninglessness he found in the world,
claimed that he wondered why he should take care of his children: “But my family—
wife and children—are also human. They are placed just as I am: they must either live in
a lie or see the terrible truth. Why should they live? Why should I love them, guard
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them, bring them up or watch them? That they may come to the despair that I feel, or
else be stupid?”44 The “terrible truth” to which Tolstoy refers is that life is meaningless.
This passage suggests that he judged, not merely that his own life was meaningless and
not worth living, but that no life was worth living. Therefore, though he might have been
preoccupied with morality, it was out of skepticism about why he should care for
others.45
Even if it is true that all depressed people have moral desires, the existence of
these desires may not be enough to explain why they are not well off. The explanation
would have to claim that their moral desires are being frustrated, and the disvalue of this
moral desire frustration is significant enough to explain why they are badly off. But the
truth of the latter of these two claims is far from obvious, especially if one accepts a
version of the desire theory according to which only self-regarding desires are relevant to
welfare. On this view, the satisfaction or frustration of moral desires would seem to be
irrelevant to welfare.

2.1.3 Desires for meaning
Perhaps instead we should interpret Tolstoy and others as expressing a deep desire
for meaning in life. Both Solomon and Tolstoy appear to attribute their inactivity to an
absence of meaning in life. When they say that life is meaningless, this could be
evidence that they desire meaning in life but believe that bringing it about is impossible.
Rather than showing that they have no deep concerns, these statements could be an
expression of one of the deepest desires people have.
44
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There are two problems with this interpretation, however. The first, and most
serious, problem is that there is simply no reason to take these statements as expressing a
desire for meaning. My claim that water is flavorless does not, by itself, imply that I
desire water to have flavor. An inference to the existence of a desire requires more than a
claim about flavorlessness or meaninglessness. Andrew Solomon mentions the way that
life appears meaningless in his depression apparently only to describe what it is like to be
depressed, and not to lament a lack of meaning.
Second, even if we suppose the depressed person does desire meaning in life,
there are problems in showing that these desires could be satisfied. Desire for meaning is
either a desire for subjective meaning or objective meaning. Subjective meaning is
meaning grounded in or created by a person’s own desires or pursuits. Objective
meaning is meaning which exists independently of those desires or pursuits. If Tolstoy
desires that his activities have objective meaning, then in order to say that his desire for
meaning is satisfied, it must be possible for his activities to be objectively meaningful.
But for a number of reasons, desire theorists may wish to reject the view that objective
meaning in life is possible. One reason is that they might find the desire theory attractive,
in part, because it is seen as part of a broader project to reduce facts about value to facts
about desire.
The alternative is to suppose that Tolstoy desires merely subjective meaning. If
he desires subjective meaning, then the meaning he is looking for is the kind that would
be grounded in or created by his own desires or pursuits. But Tolstoy does not appear to
desire this sort of meaning. This is evidenced by the fact that he considers the lives of his
family to be as meaningless as his own. Unless his family members were similarly
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depressed, they would have concerns and pursuits of the kind that would give their lives
subjective meaning, and Tolstoy would be aware of this. If Tolstoy were expressing a
desire only for subjective meaning, he would have no reason to judge their lives to be
meaningless. As discussed in Section 1.4, severely depressed people sometimes refuse
treatment which they believe will give them a normal range of desires. If what they
desired was to have meaning-conferring projects and pursuits, and they knew that
treatment would give them these desires, we would expect them to desire treatment rather
than refuse it.

2.2. Counterfactual Desires
Another way the desire theorist might try to respond to the problem of depression
is to accept a version of the desire theory according to which the desires relevant to wellbeing are counterfactual desires. This response makes sense if we accept that the
depressed person lacks actual desires that could explain why they are not well-off.
According to the most common counterfactual version of the desire theory, which I will
call the “ideal desire theory,” the desires relevant to well-being are the desires a person
would have if they were informed and thinking rationally. What is good for a person, on
this view, is to get what their informed, rational self would want.
To see how the ideal desire theory might avoid the problem of depression, recall
what the problem of depression argument says:

Problem of Missing Desires (MD)
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6. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent they are getting what
they want.
7. Some depressed people want almost nothing, but are getting what they want.
8. So, according to desire theories, nothing could make them better off than they
are.
9. But there are things which could make them better off than they are.
10. Therefore, desire theories are false.

To apply this argument an ideal desire theory, the first premise, which is a
statement of the theory, must be revised to say, “Desire theories claim a person is welloff to the extent they are getting what they would want if informed and rational.” The
second premise must also be revised, since it is a claim about what desires a person has
which will be used to determine their well-being. It must say: “Some depressed people, if
they were informed and rational, would want almost nothing, but are getting what they
would want.” In short, the new argument must claim that whatever desires the depressed
person would have after being informed and rational are mostly being satisfied, and so
the ideal desire theory is committed to saying that nothing could make the depressed
person better off.

Problem of Missing Informed Desires (MID)
1. Informed desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent they are
getting what they would want if informed and rational.
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2. Some depressed people would want almost nothing if they were informed and
rational, but are getting what they would want.
3. So, according to desire theories, nothing could make them better off than they
are.
4. But there are things which could make them better off than they are
5. Therefore, desire theories are false.

The ideal desire theorist could respond to MID by denying (2). They could argue
that the depressed person’s informed and rational self would want many things which
they are unlikely to get because of their depression.46 Depressed people may be missing
or are ignoring information about what their life could be like. If they had correct
information, they might have desires they actually lack. Or perhaps the depressed person
irrationally takes minor criticism as conclusive evidence that they are worthless, so that
they lack desires because of this irrational thinking. Correcting errors in reasoning like
this may cause them to desire things they previously did not desire. The desires that
would result from idealization are likely to be frustrated for the same reasons discussed at
the beginning of 2.1—that the inactivity caused by depression will make the depressed
person unable to take the necessary steps to satisfy those desires.
Evaluating this response requires considering whether making the depressed
person informed and rational is likely to have an effect on their desires. I will consider in
turn the effect of each type of idealization on depressed desires. In section 2.2.1, I
consider the possibility that ideal rationality will generate the required desires, and in
46

Or, at least, would want whatever is needed to explain why they are not well-off.
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2.2.2, I consider the possibility that information will generate the required desires. I
argue that we have no good reason for thinking either type of idealization will have an
effect on the desires of most depressed people.

2.2.1 Rational desires
In asking whether making the depressed person rational will affect their desires, it
is important to be clear about what exactly we mean by “rational.” Many accounts of
ideal rationality have been offered. Richard Brandt, for example, takes ideal rationality
to be the product of something like cognitive psychotherapy.47 According to Michael
Smith being ideally rational requires, among other things, having a “maximally coherent
and unified” set of desires, and not being affected by “physical and emotional
disturbances.”48
For my purposes, I will assume that ideal rationality requires full epistemic and
practical rationality. My focus will be on improvement in epistemic rationality, as I am
skeptical that any kind of improvement in practical rationality will generate the required
desires. This is because requirements of practical reason usually have to do with what
one is required to do, or be motivated to do, given one’s other beliefs and desires. For
example, instrumental rationality requires that one take the necessary means to one’s
ends. But in the sort of cases we have been describing, the depressed person desires
almost nothing, and the desires that remain are for the most part being satisfied. Other
requirements of practical reason, such as the requirements of consistency and coherence,
would seem unlikely to make a difference for similar reasons. The coherence
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requirement, for example, requires that one’s desires be organized in such a way as to
promote maximal overall desire satisfaction. This can require that one not have certain
ends. To have drinking alcohol as one’s end could be irrational if it were incompatible
with other ends to which one has assigned a higher priority. But, again, in the cases we
have been considering, the depressed person actually desires almost nothing, but is
getting the few things they do want, such as to lie in bed. So, there appears to be no
failure of coherence or consistency.49
The most promising way to argue that the depressed person would have desires if
they were rational is to argue that depression is caused by epistemic irrationality. The
basic thought is that depression is caused by irrational beliefs, and so removing that
irrationality would allow a normal range of desires to return. The view that irrational
beliefs are responsible for depression has been influential in clinical psychology and
psychiatry. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) is a scientifically supported and widely
used type of psychotherapy which treats depression (among other conditions) by
attempting to eliminate irrational beliefs and thought patterns. The thought patterns
addressed by this therapy include things like over-generalization, the tendency to focus
on negative rather than positive aspects of one's life, and self-defeating thoughts such as
the thought that one will never succeed.50 Given that this therapy treats depression by
aiming to reduce epistemic irrationality, the effectiveness of such a therapy may be taken
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as evidence that if the depressed person were ideally epistemically rational, he would
have a normal range of desires.
However, empirical research also suggests that depressed people tend to be in
some ways more “realistic” than non-depressed people—a phenomenon known as
“depressive realism.”51 This research indicates that people with depression tend to be
less susceptible than people without depression to certain biases in reasoning, such as
overestimating one's own reputation, importance, abilities, and one's control over events.
Moreover, empirical research on the factors responsible for treatment effect in
psychotherapy indicates that the improvement in mood and motivation attributed to
therapies like CBT is due to factors which are common to all effective psychotherapies,
many of which do not focus on challenging irrational beliefs. Common factors theory
suggests that factors like having a supporting and trusting patient/therapist relationship
are doing most of the work in psychotherapeutic change, whereas the “specific
ingredients” of particular psychotherapeutic approaches, like CBT and its focus on
irrational beliefs, are doing comparatively little work.52
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, CBT and related therapies are far from
universally effective in treating depression. In some cases, anti-depressant medication or
electroshock therapy is the only effective treatment. This fact points to the conclusion
that irrational belief is not responsible for the existence of depression in all cases. In
research on the etiology of depression, the consensus seems to be that there are many
51
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causes of depression.53 In one form of depression, known as Seasonal Affective Disorder
(SAD), depression appears to be caused by reduced exposure to sunlight during winter
months, which in turn causes a change in neurochemistry.54 The difference between a
non-depressed person and someone with SAD does not seem to be a difference in
rationality. All of this suggests that even significant improvements in epistemic
rationality will not remove depression in all cases which, and so also gives us reason to
doubt that full epistemic rationality would generate the required desires in all depressed
people.
Before moving on, it is worth looking at a different sort of response based on the
irrationality of the depressed person. In the “the Moral Problem,” Michael Smith defends
the view that a fully rational agent is one who is not emotionally disturbed.

Desires are irrational to the extent that they are wholly and solely the product of
psychological compulsions, physical addictions, emotional disturbances, and the
like; to the extent that they wouldn’t be had by someone in a non-depressed, nonaddictive, non-emotionally disturbed state.55

Smith is here arguing that desires which are entirely the product of a disorder or a
disease are not relevant to one’s normative reasons. But the same thinking could apply to
well-being. Desires produced by a disease like depression are irrational and therefore not
relevant to a person’s welfare. Depression can affect one’s ability to form new desires,
and so it might be claimed that a fully rational person must not be depressed (or at least
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not have this particular symptom of depression). This response dovetails nicely with the
argument considered above which claimed that cognitive therapy can eliminate
depression by making the depressed person more rational. My response was in part to
say that cognitive therapy does not work for everyone, and so we should be skeptical of
the claim that a more rational version of all depressed people will have desires. But now
the desire theorist can say that, in exactly those cases, the inability on the part of the
depressed person to form new desires in the face of rational therapy is proof that their
desires, or lack of them, are irrational.
However, while the inability to form or reject a desire can lead to irrationality, it
does not itself constitute irrationality. If the inability to eliminate a desire were enough to
make a desire irrational, it seems that many desires which appear perfectly rational would
turn out to be irrational. A non-depressed person’s most basic desires, such as the desire
that one’s children be happy, may be quite steadfast—as steadfast as a depressed person’s
absence of desire. But these desires do not seem irrational. There are also many desires
non-depressed people lack, such as a desire to end the world, which they may be unable
to come to have through reflection—at least, as unable as some depressed people are to
form new desires. But those absences of desire do not seem irrational.
So, it cannot be the case that desires or their absence are irrational simply on the
grounds that they are stubborn. It is important to ask why irremovable desires or their
absence count as irrational. It is not enough to say that it is because diseases such as
depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder cause ones thinking to be irrational, since
this is precisely what needs to be explained. The most plausible explanation is that if a
desire is wholly dependent on the existence of a disease, then the existence of that desire
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is not subject to rational rejection. The disease has complete control over whether one
has that desire. The desires of a fully rational agent, by contrast, may be eliminated if,
upon reflection, they are found to conflict with the satisfaction of other, more important
desires. The same could be said for the absence of desire: a fully rational agent is one
who can come to form a desire to take necessary means to a given end, and so is able to
form new desires. Desires or their absence which are wholly produced by an emotional
disturbance or addiction may be irrational, but only if this leads to a conflict with
standard requirements of rationality, such as consistency and coherence. The depressed
person may be unable to form the desire to go to work or accept treatment for her
depression, but for reasons discussed earlier in this section, it is not clear that standard
requirements of rationality, like coherence and consistency, require them to form these
desires.

2.2.2 Informed desires
Many have thought that a plausible version of the desire theory must take into
account the desires we would have if we had all relevant information, and not merely our
actual desires. This is because there are things we desire only because we do not know
any better, and there are things we do not desire but would desire if we knew more about
them. For example, I might desire to eat licorice ice cream on a friend’s
recommendation, but would not desire to eat it if I knew what it tasted like. And I might
not desire to eat pistachio ice cream because I dislike pistachios, but would want to eat it
if I knew what that ice cream tastes like. If we assume that desire satisfaction is good for
a person, it seems that I am better off getting pistachio than licorice in this case because I
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would want pistachio and not licorice if I knew what they both tasted like. The ideal
desire theory agrees, while the “actual desire theory” must say, implausibly, that I would
be better off getting licorice.56
The defender of the ideal desire theory could argue that, like in the ice cream
case, if the depressed person had more information about life, they would have desires
they actually lack. The idea that information would have this effect seems widely held.
A common response to learning that someone is depressed or suicidal is to try to remind
them of all of the things we believe they have to live for: being able to smell flowers,
listen to the rain, or watch your children grow up. These are the things which most
motivate us, and when we encounter someone who is not motivated to do anything we
infer that they have somehow lost sight of these good things.
In order to know whether information would have an effect on the depressed
person’s desires, we need to know how much and what sorts of information is required to
count as informed. Many answers to these questions have been defended. Bernard
Williams held that being informed requires a correction of one’s false beliefs, as well as
56
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exercising one’s imagination about what each of their available options would be like.57
Another view claims that being informed requires being given the best knowledge of the
world available at the time.58 On a view defended by Stephen Darwall, being informed
requires knowing “all the facts regarding properties internal to the thing preferred,”
which is meant to restrict the information required to information about the objects of
one’s actual desires.59 According to Michael Smith, being informed requires having no
false beliefs and all “relevant” true beliefs.60 And on a view defended by Peter Railton,
being informed requires “full information,” about oneself and one’s circumstances.61
These views vary in the amount and kind of information required. One might
think that the best view to take about the amount of information required is a full
information view, which requires something like omniscience. The reason is that a
motivation for moving from an actual desires view to an informed desires view is that a
set of informed desires tends to be more accurate than a set of uninformed desires. It is
more accurate in the sense that an informed set of desires better represents what a person
really wants than an uninformed set by avoiding the “Dead Sea apple” phenomenon.
This is the phenomenon of regretting having wanted something because getting it reveals
that it is not as one had expected it to be.62 It might be thought that the full information
view is the best option because only full information guarantees avoidance of the dead
57

Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in Rational Action, ed. Ross Harrison
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 101-113.
58
Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right.
59
Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
60
Michael Smith, ‘Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton’, Analysis 56, no. 3 (1996):
160-168.
61
Peter Railton, “Facts and Values,” Philosophical Topics 14 (1996): 5-31; “Moral Realism,”
Philosophical Review 95 (1996): 163-207.
62

The Dead Sea apple case is a case of not knowing what the satisfaction of ones actual desires would be
like. But the information requirement is often also motivated by the case in which one does not get an
object which one would have desired had they known what it was like. The example is found originally in
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1907).

54

sea apple phenomenon. It can guarantee this because desires based on full information
are based on a perfectly accurate picture of what their satisfaction would be like. The
problem is that requiring too much information also leads to problems, such as the
problem of figuring out how to fit such a large amount of information into a finite mind.
As important as these problems with the full information view are, I think it
makes most sense to focus on full information views in attempting to answer the question
whether an informed desire view can avoid the problem of depression. This is because
more information is more likely to make a difference to a person’s desires than less
information. And I intend to argue in this section that, for some cases of depression, we
have no good reason to expect information will make a difference. If full information has
no effect on a depressed person’s desires in some cases, than less than full information is
even less likely to do so.
Even a full information account must answer questions about what kind of
information is required. One question important to the discussion that follows is whether
fully informing a person requires merely giving them a list of all true propositions, or
requires giving them certain experiences. The first of these two options David Sobel
calls the “report model.”63 According to Sobel, on this model, being fully informed
would be akin to having “expert lawyers” argue for and against each possible way one’s
life could go. For example, being informed about my ice-cream flavor decision would
require having each flavor option be argued for as fully as possible.
As Sobel points out, the problem with this model is that it does not seem to
produce enough information, leading to the Dead Sea apple possibility. It is possible that
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what it is like to have an experience is drastically different from the way even the most
vivid description might make it appear. The example involving ice cream mentioned
above illustrates this problem. Like in Frank Jackson’s example of Mary the color
scientist, I may know every piece of propositional information about licorice and
pistachio ice cream and yet lack knowledge of what it is like to experience eating those
two flavors.
The second model, which Sobel calls the “experiential model,” says that being
fully informed is a matter of knowing about every possible way one’s life could go “from
the inside” by having firsthand experience of it. This model avoids the problem of too
little information faced by the report model because it ensures that an informed person
“fully appreciates” what it is like to have this or that desire satisfied—something a mere
report supposedly cannot give them. My ice-cream decision is fully informed on this
model only if I had the experience of tasting each flavor. However, this model has
problems of its own. One problem, discussed in more detail below, is that it may not be
possible to “fully appreciate” different lives from a single perspective, since one’s ability
to fully appreciate what some experience would be like may in part depend on what
desires one has.
Since it seems that having full propositional information is compatible with
having full experiential information, and since having both sorts of information appears
to involve having more information than either by itself, I will be assuming a version of
the informed desire theory which requires both full propositional and experiential
information. With this rough idea of the information requirement in mind, we can now
ask whether an informed version of a depressed person would have the missing desires.
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a. Propositional information. First, it is important to recognize that people with
depression, as a group, have not been less acquainted with happiness in their past than
non-depressed people. In many cases, depression occurs in the absence of any setback
and despite the appearance to the depressed person and those around her that everything
in her life is going well. For this reason, if information will have an effect on the
depressed person’s desires, it will generally not be in virtue of giving them new
information about things most people tend to have intrinsic desires for, such as love,
security, or career success, for depressed people have been just as acquainted with these
things as non-depressed people.
However, depression may have the effect of causing the depressed person to
forget, distort, or be less able to focus on some of this information. It is this possibility,
in particular, which seems to explain the common reaction, mentioned above, of wanting
to remind those who are depressed and suicidal of the many things they have to live for.
The hope is that after we remind the depressed person of these things, some of their
former, non-depressed desires will return. Full information would be the most
comprehensive reminder possible.
But these efforts to remind the depressed person generally fail to motivate them.
This is because, in most cases, they have not forgotten about the existence of the things
we remind them of but, like Tolstoy, are simply no longer motivated by them. An attempt
to help a depressed or suicidal person in this way often makes things worse by making
that person feel misunderstood rather than motivating them, and is for this reason
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discouraged by mental health professionals.64
Perhaps these efforts to remind fail because depression affects how the depressed
person focuses on the information they have. They may become more myopic than nondepressed people, and generally less able to access information about life they used to
have than non-depressed people. In the section on rationality, we considered the fact that
depressed people tend to systematically discount or ignore positive things in their lives
and focus on negative things. Maybe depressed and non-depressed people are different in
this way: depressed people tend to have less access to information about their lives than
non-depressed people—namely, the positive information. By “less access” I only mean
that, due to their depression, they tend to focus less on what is going well. If given
access to this positive information, perhaps they would regain interest in life.
But though people with depression do appear to spend more time focusing on
negative facts, it does not follow that they have less access to information about the world
than non-depressed people do. All that follows is that they focus on different aspects of
their life than non-depressed people do. It might be that non-depressed people spend
equivalently more time than depressed people focusing on positive things, in which case
they may be ignoring just as much information about the world as depressed people—
namely, the negative information. If this is right, the difference between depressed
people and non-depressed people would be that they focus on different information.
It might be replied that what matters is that depressed people focus more on desire
sapping facts, such as a recent setback or one’s own mortality. So although depressed
people may be no less informed than non-depressed people, they are less informed about
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the things that tend to produce desire. Fully informing the depressed person would
involve adding the positive information, and we might expect this to produce more
desires than they have. But this seems to be mostly a guess. It is hard to know what the
effect of full information on motivation and desire will tend to be—whether it will tend to
sap motivation or increase motivation. That is, it is hard to know whether full
information will tend to move a depressed person toward becoming happy and motivated,
or tend to move a non-depressed person toward becoming more depressed. At least, I can
see no reason for thinking the balance point of full information tips in favor of creating a
non-depressed set of desires rather than a depressed set.

b. Experiential information. So far, we have mainly focused on the effect of full
propositional information on desire. It is possible that depressed people lack experiential
information that non-depressed people have. There is evidence that depression does
affect one’s ability to have certain kinds of experiences, such as the experience of
pleasure. Anhedonia, or the inability to feel pleasure, is a common symptom among
people with depression. In depression, colors can appear duller and less vibrant.65 This
inability may mean they have lost crucial information about what the experience feels
like, even if they remember having had pleasure experiences in the past. If they were to
have a vivid enough awareness of what these experiences are like, perhaps they would
desire to have those experiences.66
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The problem is that changing the depressed person in this way may make them
unable to have the experience of not taking pleasure in anything, and so not able to fully
appreciate what life would be like as a depressed person. This is an instance of a more
general problem for the experiential model of full information theories: being able to
appreciate what it is like to have certain experiences sometimes precludes being able to
appreciate what it is like to have other kinds of experiences, and so no single, fully
informed perspective may be possible. To illustrate the problem, Connie Rosati gives us
the example of an obtuse person who, being obtuse, is unable to appreciate what it would
be like to experience life as a compassionate person.67 To make them able to know what
the life of the compassionate person is like “from the inside” would require that they take
on the ideals, traits, and motivations which characterize the compassionate person. Or it
may require adding the capacity for certain emotional experiences that the obtuse person
lacks. But if this is done, it creates someone who no longer has the ideals, traits,
motivations and emotional capacities necessary for appreciating a life as the obtuse
person would experience it.
Likewise, if we change the depressed person so that they are capable of fully
appreciating what it is like to experience life in a non-depressed state, we make them
unable to know how it feels to be depressed. Even a person who has experienced
depression in the past may no longer have a sufficiently vivid awareness of what the
emptiness of depression feels like.
To summarize, the defense of the informed desire theory in this section was to say
that full experiential information would create a normal range of desires in the depressed
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person because this idealization would allow them to truly appreciate what life is like as a
non-depressed person—fully knowing again the experience of joy, for example. But, I
objected, it is impossible for the depressed person to have this knowledge and at the same
time know what it is like to be depressed. So the set of desires they would have as a
result would not be based on full information, but only different information, and so we
would have no reason to privilege this set of desires over the depressed set.

2.3 Future Desires
A different approach claims that the depressed person is not well-off because
depression leads to the frustration of future desires—desires a person will have in the
future. Depression is usually treatable and can sometimes naturally subside even without
treatment. When this happens, depression usually gives way to a normal range of desires.
If the depressed person fails to do certain things while depressed, they may wind up
frustrating their own future desires. The depressed person’s failure to get out of bed or
seek treatment, for example, could lead to the frustration of their future desire to have
financial stability.
The problem of depression argument says that the depressed person is not well-off
when they are depressed, and it says the desire theory must claim they are well-off. We
can grant that the frustration of a person’s actual future desires makes their life as a whole
go less well, but it is not clear that it makes their life go less well in the present—at a
time long before they have these desires. This would seem to require holding a version
of the desire theory which says that a desire satisfaction benefits you at all times in your
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life, or that your level of welfare at a time depends only on how well your life as a whole
goes. Dale Dorsey offers a number of reasons for thinking such a view is unattractive.68
In any case, this response faces an even more serious challenge in defending its
second premise. The problem is that not all depressed people will have actual future
desires. For some, depression does not subside naturally. In some of those cases,
treatment can alleviate their depression. However, not everyone gets treatment. Some
lack information about its existence and as a result remain depressed. Others are aware
but refuse treatment. Finally, some depressed people lack future desires because they die
from suicide. These people will not have future, non-depressed desires. So, the desire
theorist cannot appeal to the frustration of their future desires to explain why their life is
not going well.
A reply would be to claim that possible future desires are relevant to well-being.
This would avoid the problem just mentioned since, although depressed people who will
not actually come to have future desires, they nevertheless could have future desires. I
consider this response at length in the following chapter.
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Chapter 2 focused on the strategy of responding to the problem of depression by
denying premise (2) of (MD):

Problem of Missing Desires (MD)
1. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent they are getting what they
want.
2. Some depressed people want almost nothing, but are getting what they want.
3. So, according to desire theories, nothing could make them better off than they are.
4. But there are things which could make them better off than they are.
5. Therefore, desire theories are false.
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This strategy involved trying to show that the depressed person has, or would
have under ideal conditions, desires which will be frustrated. Chapter 2 argued that this
strategy fails. In light of this failure, the desire theorist must consider a different strategy.
The present chapter looks at one such alternative strategy. It involves revising or
clarifying the desire theory as stated in (1) in such a way that (3), which is supposed to
follow from (1) and (2), does not follow. Given that the expression of the desire theory
in (1) can be made more precise in a number of ways, it is not exactly clear that this does
follow.

3.1. Object vs Combo View
One attempt the desire theorist could make to avoid the problem of depression
would be to appeal to the distinction between a version of the desire theory which says
that what has intrinsic prudential value is the object of a person’s desire and a version
which says that what has intrinsic prudential value is the satisfaction of a desire—in other
words, an object and the desiring of that object.69

Object View: X is good for S iff S desires x.
Combo View: X is good for S iff x is a desire satisfaction (desire + object).70
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The desire theorist might claim that the problem of depression poses a challenge
to the object view but not the combo view. The argument would begin with the claim
that the combo view allows for more things to make a person better off than the object
view. This is because the object view appears to limit what can be good for a person to
the things they happen to desire. Put another way, one’s maximal well-being is limited,
on the object view, by the set of objects one happens to desire (on the plausible
assumption that maximal well-being is limited by the things that can improve wellbeing). The combo view has no such limit. It says that what is good for a person is the
having of a desire satisfaction, which seems to involve no requirement about which
objects are desired. Desire satisfactions, on the combo view, would be treated like units
of pleasure, where the more of them one gets, the better. In this way, maximal wellbeing for a person is limited only by the number of desire satisfactions one could have.
The object view runs into the problem of depression because it commits the desire
theorist to saying that, for the depressed person, only the objects of their few desires
could improve their well-being. Because the depressed person has almost all of them, it
says they are nearly as well-off as they could be. The combo view is able to avoid the
problem because, though the depressed person desires very few things, they could have
many desire satisfactions by having many desires, and so could be much better off than
they are.

desires it. For a defense of desire theories along these lines, see Joseph Mendola, Human Interests or
Ethics for Physicalists (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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While this response gets something right, what it gets right does not depend on
the object/combo view distinction. The reason this distinction is not relevant is that a
proponent of the object view can also claim that “more is better.” Their view says the
object of desire has value, but the desire for that object is a background condition on the
object having value (there would be no object with prudential value without a desire for
it). So, like the combo view, the object view requires the existence of a desire and the
existence of the object of that desire in order for value to obtain. The object and combo
views disagree only about “where” the intrinsic prudential value in a desire satisfaction is
located—the object only, or the object and the desire.
The mistake made in the suggested response is assuming that the object view is
committed to saying that only the objects of actual desires have prudential value. The
distinction between views which count only actual desires as relevant to well-being and a
view which counts actual and possible desires as relevant is orthogonal to the
object/combo view distinction. The combo view could also restrict what is good for a
person to actual desire satisfactions, and the object view could allow the objects of
possible desires to be relevant to a person’s welfare. The response is in the right
direction because it points to what seems to matter: the difference between saying only a
person’s actual desires are relevant to how well-off they can be, and saying that desires
they could have are relevant. Section 3 will look at how this distinction may play a role
in solving the problem of depression for the desire theory.
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3.2. Fraction vs Integer View
Another potential solution the problem by making the desire theory more precise
involves paying attention to how a desire theory measures well-being. As noted in
Chapter 1, a good theory of well-being should tell us more than just what things are
prudentially good and bad. Another thing a theory should tell us is how to measure wellbeing given facts about what things are good and bad. The simplest possible answer to
the measurement question is that when you get something which is intrinsically good for
you, your well-being improves, other things being equal. But many other questions about
measurement remain. How much does each object improve your well-being? On a
desire theory, one desired object might improve your well-being more than another
depending on things like how intense the desire is, how central the desire is in your set of
desires, or whether you get the object earlier or later in life.71 Though these questions
about measurement are important, they are not the questions about measurement relevant
to the present response. The present response is concerned with how desire satisfactions
and frustrations are counted.
On a version of the desire theory which I will call the “fraction view,” your wellbeing is thought of as the proportion of your satisfied desires to your total desires. More
precisely, your well-being at a time t is calculated by dividing the number of your
satisfied desires at t by your total number of desires at t.

Fraction View: S’s well-being at t = # of S’s satisfied desires at t
# S’s desires at t
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For example, if you have 10 desires, and 9 of them are satisfied, your level of well-being
would be represented as 9/10. Importantly, on this view, 1 represents maximal wellbeing. In the example just considered, you are as well-off as you can be when all 10 of
your desires are satisfied.
On an alternative view, which I will call the “integer view,” your well-being is
thought of as a whole number which represents your satisfied desires minus your
frustrated desires.

Integer View: S’s well-being at t = (# of S’s satisfied desires at t) – (# of S’s
frustrated desires at t)

In the previous example, you had 10 desires, 9 of which were satisfied. Since you have 1
frustrated desire, your level of well-being would be represented as 8 (9 satisfied desires
minus1frustrated desire).
The following example may further help illustrate the difference. Suppose A
through E are versions of your life at time t in which you had different numbers of desires
and satisfactions. The top row (SD) represents the number of desires that are satisfied,
and the bottom row (D) represents the total number of desires you have at t:

Ex.1

A

|

B

|

C

|

D |

E

SD

1

20

18

0

0

D

1

20

20

1

20
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Fraction

1

1

9/10

0

0

Integer

1(1-0) 20 (20-0) 16(18-2) -1 (0-1) -20 (0-20)

Here, the fraction view has the result that A and B are equally well off, and D and
E are equally well off. This is because the proportion of satisfied desires to desires is the
same in each case. The integer view, by contrast, says that B is doing better than A, and
D is doing better than E. This is because B and D have a greater balance of satisfied
desires than A and E, respectively.
There is some reason for thinking that only the fraction view is subject to the
problem of depression argument. Recall again what that argument says:

Problem of Missing Desires (MD)
1. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent they are getting what
they want.
2. Some depressed people want almost nothing, but are getting what they want.
3. So, according to desire theories, nothing could make them better off than they
are.
4. But there are things which could make them better off than they are.
5. Therefore, desire theories are false.
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The desire theorist can claim that this argument succeeds only if we interpret (1)
as expressing the fraction view. Imagine that the depressed person is A and the nondepressed person is B. According to the fraction view, since both A and B are getting
everything they want, they are equally (and maximally) well off. This seems wrong
because we want to say that B, the non-depressed person, is better off than A, the
depressed person. The integer view can explain this intuition. According to the integer
view, B is better off than A because B is getting a greater balance of desire satisfactions
than A. The force of the problem of depression comes from the thought that the desire
theory is committed to saying that the depressed person, since they are getting virtually
everything they desire, is doing well—as well as anyone else who is getting virtually
everything they desire. But this is only true of the desire theory if it says that two people
are equally well-off whenever they are getting the same proportion of their desires
satisfied. Since the integer view measures well-being, not in terms of the proportion of
desires satisfied, but in terms of the number of desires satisfied over the number
frustrated, it can explain why the depressed person is not as well-off as a non-depressed
person. The integer view says A’s well-being is 1 and B’s well-being is 20, so it is at least
able to represent a difference between the well-being of A and B, and it seems to be
representing the difference that matters. While A is getting some desire satisfaction, A is
still relatively badly off compared to B, who is getting much more desire satisfaction.
And this seems to be an intuitive explanation of why the depressed person’s life is not
going as well, despite the fact that they appear to be getting what they want. Their life is
not going as well because depression has sapped their desires, and thereby sapped their
capacity for desire satisfaction.
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It might be objected that the best way to understand the difference between the
depressed and non-depressed person, on the desire theory, is not as the difference
between A and B—as the mere difference in the number of their desires, but something
less crude. Most plausible versions of the desire theory will count some desire
satisfactions as more valuable than others. For example, most versions accept that the
strength of a desire is relevant to the value of its satisfaction. The satisfaction of a strong
desire is held to contribute more to well-being than a weaker desire, other things being
equal. If this is right, then A might be better off than B if A’s single desire is sufficiently
strong and B’s desires are sufficiently weak.
But while representing the depressed and non-depressed person as A and B is a
crude oversimplification, this fact does not undermine the argument against the fraction
view. This is because all that is needed to show the fraction view is inadequate is a single
case in which two people have something like the desire profiles of A and B. Even
taking into account all of the subtleties involved in an accurate measurement of wellbeing on any version of the desire theory, it is possible to imagine a case in which two
people have the same proportion of their desires satisfied, have overlapping desires (B
has all the desires A has) but differ in the amount of desires they have (B has more than
A). As long as it seems B is doing better than A, the fraction view will be unable to
represent that difference.
As with the argument in the previous section, while this argument against the
fraction view notices something important, it alone does not solve the problem of
depression. This is because premise (3) says
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3. So, according to desire theories, nothing could make them better off than they
are.

It is not clear that, even on a version of the desire theory which accepts the integer view,
the desire theorist can explain how a depressed person could be better off than they are.
After all, the desire theory says that what is good for a person is getting what they want,
and a natural way of understanding what this means is that only the satisfaction of the
depressed person’s desires could make them better off. If the depressed person is getting
what they want, then, even if it is true that the non-depressed person has more satisfied
desires and is therefore better off, it doesn’t straightforwardly follow that the depressed
person could be better off. What is missing from the discussion is what was pointed at by
the argument in the previous section—the distinction between versions of the desire
theory which take actual desires and possible desires to be relevant to well-being. I turn
to this distinction in the next section.

3.3. Actual vs Possible Desires
In order for MD to succeed as an objection to the desire theory, an assumption
must be made about how to interpret premise (1).

1. Desire theories claim a person is well-off to the extent they are getting what
they want.
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To say that one’s well-being is determined by the extent to which one is getting what they
want could mean one of two things. First, it could mean that your well-being is
determined only by how many of your actual desires are satisfied:

Actual desires view: S’s maximal well-being at t = the satisfaction of all and
only S’s actual desires at t.

On this interpretation, you are as well of as you can be when all of your actual
desires are satisfied. If you had only one desire at t and it was satisfied, you would have
desire satisfaction to the greatest extent possible, and so be as well off at t as you could
be. Second, it could mean that your well-being is determined by possible desire
satisfactions.

Possible desires view: S’s maximal well-being at t = the satisfaction of the
maximal amount of desires S could have at t.

On this meaning, you are at maximal well-being when you have all of the desires
you could have and they are satisfied. This means that you could be better off than
having all of your actual desires satisfied if you could have additional desires which got
satisfied. In other words, a version of you in a nearby possible world who is identical to
you except who has an additional desire you do not have (which gets satisfied) is better
off than you are, other things being equal. The actual desires view would deny this
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because that additional desire is not one you have in the actual world, and so its
satisfaction is irrelevant to your well-being.
According to the actual desires view, your maximum well-being is determined by
looking only at those possible worlds in which your actual desires remain fixed, and
finding the world in which the greatest number of your actual desires were satisfied. By
“remain fixed,” I mean that, in those worlds, you have all and only the desires you have
in the actual world. More clearly, if we let p1 be the actual world, the actual desires view
says to look at only those worlds in which you have the desires you have in p1. There
will be some world, p2, in that domain in which the number of your satisfied (p1) desires
is greater than or equal to the number of satisfied (p1) desires in any other world in that
domain. That will be the world where you are as well off as you could be.
By contrast, according to the possible desires view, the domain of possible worlds
relevant to how well-off you can be is not restricted by your actual desires. We also need
to consider possible worlds in which you have a different set of desires than you have in
the actual world. Among those possible worlds, the possible desires view tells us to look
simply for the one(s) in which you have the greatest balance of satisfied desires over
frustrated desires. There will be some world, p3, in which the number of satisfied desires
minus frustrated desires is greater than or equal to the number in any other world in that
domain, and there you will be as well off as you could be.
If we interpret (1) in the second way—that is, as referring to the possible desire
version of the desire theory, then (3) does not follow. This is because the depressed
person described in (2) has very few actual desires and is getting them all satisfied, but
could have more desires which could get satisfied. If they were not depressed, for

74

example, they would have many desires they now lack, and many of those desires could
get satisfied. So the depressed person could have desire satisfaction to a greater extent
than they actually have, and so are not nearly as well-off as they could be.
Only if we read (1) in the first way—as referring to the actual desires version of
the desire theory—then (3) seem plausible. This is because, if every one of the depressed
person’s actual desires are getting satisfied, then the actual desires view will say that
person is as well off as they could be. The actual desires view cannot point to the desires
the depressed person could have in order to show that they could be better off. Thus, the
possible desires view but not the actual desires view appears to be able to solve the
problem of depression.
The possible desires view may have other advantages as well. One problem for
the actual desires view is that it seems unable to make sense of interpersonal comparisons
of welfare. This is because, if only actual desires are relevant to welfare, we cannot say a
person S would have been better off if they had had more desires which got satisfied. If S
has 2 desires which both get satisfied, and U has 4 desires which all get satisfied, then, on
an integer version of the desire theory, it would make sense to say that U is doing better
than S. This is why the integer view seemed to be more plausible than the fraction view.
But now suppose that S* is S in another possible world where S* has 4 desires which are
all satisfied. The actual desires view seems committed to saying that S would not have
been better off as S* because at least two of S*’s desires are not desires S has in the actual
world. But this leaves the actual desires view committed to the strange result that
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1. U and S* have the same number of satisfied desires (4 net satisfied desires
each)
2. U is better off than S (4 net satisfied desires is better than 2)
3. S* is not better off than S (4 net satisfied desires is not better than 2)

While this points to a problem for the actual desires view, it is not as bad as it
looks. Commitment to claims 1-3 does not show, for example, that the actual desires
view is committed to a contradiction (that 4 net satisfied desires both is and is not better
than 2 net satisfied desires). This is because the actual desires view can and does say that
whether a desire satisfaction improves welfare for a person depends on whether that
person actually has that desire. S can be better off only by getting S’s actual desires
satisfied. So S* is not better off than S. But this does seem to leave it a mystery how we
can say that U is better off than S.
To summarize this section, a promising solution to the problem of depression is to
deny (3) in the argument above by pointing out that we have no reason to accept it if (1)
is interpreted in the right way. If we read (1) as saying that you are well-off to the extent
that the desires you could have are satisfied (possible desires view), then the depressed
person described in (2) is getting a relatively small number of those units compared to a
non-depressed person. We lack an account of how many of these units a person needs to
count as well-off, but it is at least not obvious, now, that the desire theory is committed to
saying that the depressed person is well-off.
The next section considers a problem for the possible desires view. Before
turning to it, let me summarize the first three sections. Accepting the integer view is
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necessary for the desire theory to avoid the problem of depression, but only because it,
and not the fraction view, is able to allow for a difference in well-being between the
depressed person and the non-depressed person (as represented by A and B) to be
expressed.
The object/combo view distinction, however, was a red-herring. Both the object
view and combo view are compatible with the possible desires view. The object view,
recall, says that what is intrinsically good for you is the object of your desire, which we
have been assuming to be a state of affairs. The combo view, by contrast, says that what
is intrinsically good for you is the combination of your desire and its object, or the state
of affairs desired. There is a temptation, I think to assume the actual desires view is
compatible only with the object view, and the possible desires view is compatible only
with the combo view. This is perhaps because the possible desires view is most easily
described as the view which says you could be better off if you had additional desires
which get satisfied. It sounds strange to say that you could be better off if you got more
objects of possible desires. But this is what an object version of the possible desires view
says. It is true that it is necessary, on this view, that you must have more desires in order
to be better off (assuming all of your actual desires are satisfied). But this does not entail
that those desires are part of what has value. Desires would be, on this view, background
conditions on a state of affairs having value.

3.4. An Objection
The solution to the problem of depression outlined above faces a serious
objection. The objection is that, if we allow that merely possible desires are relevant to
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determining your level of well-being, then the theory seems committed to saying you
would be better off if you had radically different desires from the ones you have, as long
as this means you would have more overall desire satisfaction. But in some cases, at
least, having radically different desires would not make you better off.
To begin, I think it would help to reflect on a hypothetical case of desire
replacement:

Desire Replacement Treatment: You are offered a surgical treatment which is
guaranteed to replace your desires with a set much different from the ones you
have, but which is also guaranteed to lead to greater overall desire satisfaction for
you in the long run. The treatment will not affect any of your mental capacities.
It will not make you emotionally unstable, lower your IQ, or make you less able
to empathize with others. You will not have fewer friends, or become unable to
find a job (though you may end up with different ones). You will care about just
as many things as you did before, and just as deeply, and you will get at least as
much of what you want as you did prior to the treatment.

I think that few people would opt for such a treatment, even knowing it would
lead to greater overall desire satisfaction. But the possible desires view seems to predict
that rational people would opt for it.
The change in desire produced in this case need not involve a break in
psychological continuity. You could remember that you had the treatment, and
remember everything that happened before the treatment. You just would not want those
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things any more. Nor need this change be so radical that it destroys the person
undergoing the surgery and replaces them with a new person (even assuming some
psychological view of personal identity is correct).
Still, one might doubt the possibility of such a case. One might doubt that
artificial manipulation of your desires could create a set of desires which would lead to
greater overall desire satisfaction. Perhaps knowledge that your desires were generated
in this way would lead you to lack higher order desires that your new desires be satisfied,
or to judge the objects of your desires as not really worth obtaining. So, while new
desires could be generated by such a treatment, either few would get satisfied (because
you would not see the point in getting them satisfied) or their satisfaction would not
contribute as much to your well-being (because they are not endorsed by you). But
consider those who have their depression successfully treated with medication.
Treatment can seem to produce a fairly drastic change in their desires, and they also
recognize that these desires are the product of a medication. But their recognition of this
fact does not usually lead them to see their new desires as not worth satisfying. So the
desire replacement treatment case seems psychologically possible.
It may be that part of your reluctance is due to the fact that you take yourself to
have moral reasons to have some of the desires you have. For example, you may desire
to be a teacher because you believe that that kind of career would allow you to help
others, and you believe that helping others is objectively important. Having a treatment
which would eliminate these sorts of desires might mean that you would not do what you
take yourself to have moral reasons to do. If this explains why people’s reluctance to opt
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for the treatment, then their reluctance does not show that they believe such a treatment
would be bad for them.
For this reason, it might seem better to suppose that the treatment will replace
only those desires which you do not have objective reasons to have. This would include
many desires that we do not strongly identify with, like the sorts of foods we desire. But
it would also include some desires we do strongly identify with. Consider some of the
goals you have in life. Many of these would be things you believe you have objective
reason to do—reasons not merely given by your desires. But many would not be
grounded in what you believe you have objective reason to do. You might want certain
kinds of non-moral accomplishments, or to become good at a certain sport or artistic
endeavor. You want to be around certain kinds of people and not others. You want to
read certain kinds of fiction, and become more knowledgeable about certain things but
not others. The treatment could change all these desires without changing any of the
desires that you have moral, aesthetic or epistemic reasons to have, and yet I think most
people would still be reluctant.
But I do not think we need to reimagine the replacement case in this way. If the
explanation for our reluctance to get a desire replacing treatment is that, by changing our
desires we will not do what we have moral, aesthetic or epistemic reason to do, then we
should be able to eliminate reluctance for treatment by stipulating that the new desires
will get us to do as much of what we have reason to do as we were going to do anyway.
This could be accomplished by replacing our moral desires, for example, with other,
equally morally worthy desires. We might, for example, come to desire a different
career, but one which is at least as morally good. I think even if we were given this
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assurance about our new desires, however, we would still be reluctant to get the
treatment. So our reluctance cannot be explained away as a concern about objective
reasons.
I think we are reluctant because we think the treatment would not be good for us,
and I suspect the reason we think it would not be good for us has something to do with
the importance to us of our own desires. In fact, one of the advantages of the desire
theory over competing theories of well-being is supposed to capture this importance. The
anti-paternalism advantage of the desire theory that was discussed in Chapter 1 says that
what is good for us out to be in some important sense up to us. This advantage allows
that you and I could have interests in life that are quite different from one another, and
yet we could both be living good lives as long as we are both getting what we want. The
flip-side of this is that getting what I want—or living the kind of life shaped by my
interests—is not good for you if your interests are very different from mine. The problem
with the replacement case is that, in principle at least, it could replace your interests with
mine. So the anti-paternalism advantage of the desire theory is forfeited to some extent if
the desire theory is committed to saying that the replacement treatment would be good for
you.
Where does this leave the desire theory? The desire theory seems faced with a
dilemma. Artificial desire replacement would be harmful in ordinary cases, such as in the
case just discussed, but would increase well-being for most depressed people. As
mentioned, anti-depressant treatment sometimes has the effect of drastically changing a
person’s desires. Yet in those cases it is good for the person. Either the desire theorist
must say that replacement treatments that produce more desire satisfactions are always
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good for people (in which case the treatment in the case just described is good for you),
or it is not (in which case anti-depressant treatment is not good for people).
A third option is available, however, which is to somehow explain the difference
between the ordinary replacement treatment case and the depression treatment case. One
obvious difference between the cases is that the effect of anti-depressant medication is to
create many new desires seemingly without destroying old desires. Some of the
depressed person’s desires will be eliminated. They will no longer desire to sleep all day
or to avoid contact with others. But these desires would be relatively few compared to
the amount of desires destroyed in the sort of replacement case described. In that case,
most of your desires would be replaced with different desires. If we were merely add
new satisfied desires to an ordinary person’s set of desires, this would not obviously
make them worse off.
But does this difference really explain the difference in our intuitions? Why think
that desire replacement is bad for a person, but merely adding new desires is not bad? It
cannot be that desire replacement involves creating an alien or artificial set of desires,
because the new desires can be alien or artificial in both cases.
So if desire replacement is bad for a person, it must have to do with eliminating
existing desires. How could a desire theorist explain this harm? On standard versions of
the desire theory, the only thing which is bad for a person is to have a frustrated desire.
On the possible desires view, a second way of harming someone is to lower the overall
number of satisfied desires they would have. In the desire replacement case, this second
way of harming a person cannot explain why they seem worse off because it is stipulated
that they get more overall desire satisfaction than they would have without treatment.
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But a desire theorist could say that eliminating any existing desire is a way of frustrating
desire which harms a person.
But it is not clear how eliminating a desire could be a way of frustrating that
desire. On the view of what counts as desire satisfaction and frustration set out in
Chapter 1, a desire is satisfied if, and only if, the state of affairs which is desired obtains,
and frustrated if, and only if, the desire is not satisfied. On this view, it would seem that
whether eliminating a desire harms or helps a person depends on whether the state of
affairs desired will come about or not. If the state of affairs desired will not come about,
then eliminating the desire would seem to improve well-being by preventing desire
frustration. And in the case where the eliminated desires would have gotten satisfied, so
that by eliminating their desires we deny them the benefit of having a desire which would
get satisfied, these desires would get replaced with at least as many desires which would
get satisfied. So they would not, on balance, be harmed.
To reiterate, the idea is that the replacement either eliminates desires that would
have been satisfied or it eliminates desires that would not have been satisfied, and either
way replacement leads to more overall satisfaction. If the original desires would not have
gotten satisfied, then we do them a favor by eliminating them (thereby eliminating
frustrated desires), and if the original desires would have gotten satisfied, then while it is
true that by eliminating those original desires we eliminate potential satisfied desires,
these get replaced with even more new satisfied desires. So the desire theory can give us
no explanation of our intuition that a person is harmed in the replacement case.
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3.5. A Problem for Everyone
While the problem of artificial desires is a serious problem for the possible desires
view, it may be argued that it poses an equally serious problem for the actual desires
view. This is because a person’s actual desires can also be the product of manipulation,
as in the replacement case. This is what would happen, after all, as a result of the
replacement treatment. We would have a person with actual desires that were the product
of replacement. If the problem of artificial desires is just as much a problem for the
actual desires view as it is for the possible desires view, then the problem gives us no
special reason to reject the possible desires view. Since the possible desires view seems
to offer a reply to the problem of depression, we have some reason to prefer it over the
actual desires view and no reason not to.
But is the problem of artificial desires as much of a problem for the actual desires
view? What must that view say about the replacement case? It is not initially clear what
it must say, since the actual desires view, as I have formulated it, says only that nonactual desires are irrelevant to one’s level of well-being. It does not say anything about
the effect on well-being of removing actual desires. I think the actual desires view must
say that a version of you which lacks the desires you actually have is worse off for
lacking them if those desires would have gotten satisfied in the actual world, but not if
those desires would not get satisfied in the actual world. The integer version of the actual
desires view cares about maximizing the amount of actual desire satisfaction. So if this
can be done by removing frustrated desires, doing so would make you better off. But if a
treatment removes actual desires that would otherwise get satisfied, it harms you. Since,
in the replacement case, we were supposing that your actual desires would (mostly) all

84

get satisfied if you decide not to opt for treatment, it seems the actual desires view must
say you would be made worse off by treatment. It would result in your getting fewer
desire satisfactions of the kind that matter.
So, the actual desire theory seems able to explain why the desire replacement
treatment would make a person worse off. But it is subject to the problem of depression,
since it can’t explain why a depressed person would be better off if they had more desires
than they actually have. There is a tension between solutions to each problem. It remains
open, however, whether a more modified version of either theory could solve both
problems. In the remainder of this work, I focus exploring ways of modifying the
possible desires view, as I see no way of modifying the actual desires view to avoid the
problem of depression.
In the next section, I will focus on exploring potential solutions to the replacement
desires problem for the possible desires view.

3.6. Solutions to the Desire Replacement Problem
3.6.1. Rejecting concurrentism
One way of responding to the problem of artificial desires on behalf of the
possible desires view would be to reject concurrentism. Concurrentism is the view that a
desire satisfaction is good for a person only if their desire is concurrent with its
satisfaction. In other words, only if the state of affairs desired obtains at the same time a
person desires it are they made better off. Non-concurrentism is the view that satisfying
your desire can be good for you even when you currently do not have the desire (either
because the state of affairs desired obtains after you lose the desire or before you come to
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have it). Concurrentism has not been widely accepted among desire theorists, but it does
have proponents, and there are compelling arguments in its favor.72
In any case, the desire theorist may be able to avoid the problem of artificial
desires by rejecting concurrentism. The solution involves recognizing that even though
desire replacement may change your current desires, it cannot change the desires you
once had, and many of the desires a person has are future directed. Eliminating such
desires could also thereby frustrate them because the person will no longer pursue the
satisfaction of those desires. If I have a desire now to visit Japan one day, I am now
disposed to try to get there eventually. If I no longer have that desire, I will most likely
no longer be so disposed.
On a version of the desire theory which does not accept concurrentism, a desire
can be frustrated even if it does not now exist. So eliminating a desire could harm a
person, not merely by denying them the opportunity to have a satisfied desire, but by
frustrating a desire that would not have been frustrated if it had not been eliminated. It
will still be a fact about me that I desired to visit Japan one day, but after treatment, I lose
that desire and do not get there. That past desire is thereby frustrated, and my life thereby
contains one more desire frustration.
A desire theorist could explain the badness of desire replacement, on this view, by
claiming that replacement creates less overall desire satisfaction than non-replacement.
If, for example, replacement removes 100 desires which would have gotten satisfied and
replaces them with 101 new desires which will get satisfied, we make the person worse
off because replacement thereby creates 100 frustrated desires and gives the person 101
satisfied desires—with a net result of 1 satisfied desires (according to the integer view).
72

See Section 1.3.1 for a discussion of concurrentism.
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But without desire replacement, the person would have had 100 satisfied desires and no
additional frustrations. Replacement, in this example, makes the person worse off.
But I do not think the non-concurrentist view avoids the problem posed by the
desire replacement case. We can simply imagine a version of the case in which 100
original desires are replaced with 201 satisfied desires. Now, even if we accept that
replacement frustrates the original 100 desires, it creates a balance of 101 satisfied
desires. The fact that replacement may frustrate some of the desires that get replaced
only shows that, for the treatment to be guaranteed to lead to more overall desire
satisfaction, those frustrated desires must be accounted for and offset by adding enough
new desires.

3.6.2. The authenticity constraint
What seems true about the desires produced by the replacement treatment, and
which may explain why desire replacement is bad for you, is that these new desires are
artificial. To say that they are artificial is to say they are not genuine, not authentic, or
not desires that in some important sense belong to you. To say they do not belong to you
is not to say, of course, that they are desires which belong to someone else. There is one
sense in which they do belong to you—once the new desires are implanted in you, they
are happening to you, are located in you, and play the same type of role in your mental
life that your other desires play. But they do not belong to you in another sense of
‘belong,’ which is the sense in which your desires are ones with which you identify, or
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which otherwise came about as a result of a process that normally produces authentic
desires.73
Given that the replacement desires have this property, this suggests a solution to
the desire replacement problem for the desire theorist. The desire theorist can claim that
only the satisfaction of authentic desires is intrinsically good for a person.

Authentic Desire Theory: a desire satisfaction (or the object of your desire) is
good for you only if it is an authentic desire of yours.74

This version of the desire theory says that not all desire satisfactions are equally
good for you. If a desire of yours is created by hypnosis, or some other means of
manipulating you, then its satisfaction is not as good for you as the satisfaction of a desire
which is truly yours. This view can be contrasted with one which says that inauthentic
desire satisfactions are no worse for you than authentic ones.
This version of the desire theory appears to handle the objection involving desire
replacement. It explains the badness of desire replacement by claiming that the new
desires are inauthentic in virtue of the way they were created, and so even if it is true that
they will get satisfied, the satisfaction of these new desires contributes less to well-being
than the satisfaction of the original, authentic desires. The switching can result in lower
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I try to say more about what counts as ‘authentic desire’ below, though what I say there is mostly to
admit that I do not know.
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Perhaps the extent to which a desire is authentic modulates how prudentially valuable its satisfaction is,
rather than simply whether it is authentic or not, since authenticity of desire may be a matter of degree. In
this case, the theory would say: the extent to which a desire satisfaction (or object of desire) is good for
you depends on the extent to which the desire is authentic.
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overall well-being despite the fact that switching creates a greater number of satisfied
desires overall.
Aside from providing a plausible explanation for why switching is bad for a
person, the authentic desire theory can also explain why the subject in the replacement
case is not doomed to live a life without well-being. Despite our intuition that the
replacement treatment makes a person worse off than no treatment, it surely will seem
possible for a person who goes through this treatment to go on to live a decent life (even
given that their life as a whole involves less overall desire satisfaction, which is stipulated
in the case). This is because any plausible view about what makes a desire count as
authentic ought to allow that someone with mostly inauthentic desires can come to have
mostly authentic desires. Victims of brainwashing, or other manipulations which result
in inauthentic desires, can and do manage to come to have authentic desires. This may
even be a normal part of development from childhood into adulthood—a process which
involves moving from a set of beliefs and desires that were instilled in us to a set of
beliefs and desires which we can rightly call our own. If we imagine what would happen
to you after the desire replacement treatment, we would expect a period of change that
might be very similar to what would happen upon leaving a cult or becoming an adult.
The once inauthentic desires would give rise to authentic ones. Perhaps even the
replacement desires themselves may come to be a part of your identity through some
authenticating process. In this way, the authentic desire theory can both explain why
desire switching is bad for a person, while also allowing that a person who undergoes this
desire switching in their twenties can go on to live a good life.
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Chris Heathwood considers and responds to this sort of argument for accepting
the authentic desire theory:

If I acquire a desire by means of some artificial process (such as overzealous
marketing, or brainwashing), it is tempting to think that satisfying the desire is not
good for me because I don’t ‘really want’ the thing, because the desire conflicts
with my ‘true self’, because the desire is in some way ‘inauthentic’… [But] the
only sense that can be made of the idea of a desire being ‘inauthentic’, or in
conflict with one’s ‘true self’, is that the desire conflicts with many other desires
held by the person.75

Heathwood’s response is that what it means to say that a desire is inauthentic is
that the desire is in conflict with many of one’s other desires. And desires which are in
conflict with many other desires you have are such that satisfying them means that those
many other desires are frustrated. So the satisfaction of such desires can be bad for you,
but only because it leads to less overall desire satisfaction. If Heathwood is right that
what it means for a desire to be inauthentic is for it to be in conflict with one’s other
desires in this way, then no special restriction needs to be added to the desire theory to
say that inauthentic desire satisfaction not good for you, because the unrestricted version
of the theory can already explain why this is true. Satisfying an inauthentic desire, on his
view, is intrinsically good for you, but all-things-considered bad for you because it is
outweighed by all of the desire frustration this leads to.
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But I do not think that Heathwood’s account of authentic desire is correct. It is
not true that inauthentic desires are nothing other than desires that are in conflict with
many other desires you have. According to Robert Noggle, theories about the
authenticity of desire (among other mental states) fall into three types.76 First are
“structural theories,” which maintain that whether a desire is authentic or not depends on
a structural relationship to some other part of that person’s psychology. An example of
one such relationship discussed in the literature is the relationship between first and
second order desires. A second order desire is a desire about some first order desire one
has which counts as an endorsement of that first order desire. Endorsed desires count as
authentic, whereas those which are not endorsed (or are even opposed) are inauthentic.
The second type of theory are “historical theories,” which make the authenticity of a
desire depend on whether it arose in the right way or was the product of certain causal
processes and not others. The “right way” for a desire to arise to count as authentic, on
such theories, is to not arise as a result of manipulation by some source external to the
self. Finally, according to “substantive theories” of authenticity, the authenticity of a
desire depends on its relationship to something like truth or goodness. So, for example,
an authentic desire would be one which is directed at things which are objectively good,
or are based on true beliefs, whereas inauthentic desires are not.
All three of these types of theories seem to allow for desires to count as authentic
which conflict with many of one’s other desires, and to count as inauthentic which do not
conflict with many of one’s other desires. On a substantive theory, an authentic desire is
one which, for example, aims at things which are objectively good. It seems entirely
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possible for a desire which aims at something objectively good to conflict with many of
one’s other desires. An evil dictator might have all of his desires organized around
conquering the world and wiping out non-white races, but also have a desire to spend all
of his time taking care of and raising his child. Were he to do the latter, he could not do
the former. So, according to Heathwood’s theory, his desire to be with his child is
inauthentic. But according to the substantive theory under consideration, this desire
would be perhaps one of his only authentic desires.
An historical theory claims that a desire is authentic as long as it was produced in
the right way and inauthentic otherwise. But here, too, it seems possible to imagine
desires which are not produced by manipulation and which conflict with many of one’s
other desires. To take the last example, we can imagine the dictator’s desire to spend all
his time with his child was not the product of manipulation. Yet, in that example, it
conflicted with virtually all of his other desires.
Structural theories are perhaps the most likely to be consistent with Heathwood’s
view about authenticity, since consistency among one’s set of desires appears to be a
matter of how one’s desires are structured. However, if having a second order desire
which counts as an endorsement of a first order desire is enough to make the first order
desire authentic, then it is easy to imagine endorsing a desire which is in conflict with
many of one’s other desires. To be compatible with Heathwood’s view, something more
complex than having a second order desire would be required. The structural
requirement for a desire to count as authentic may need to include that it a desire be
consistent with many of one’s other desires. However, how many of one’s other desires
must a desire be consistent with in order to count as authentic? Let us suppose it is
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enough that satisfying the desire would lead to less overall desire satisfaction than if the
desire were not satisfied. Heathwood refers to such desires as “all-things-considered
defective.” One can see how such a desire might be thought to not reflect my true self,
since satisfying it means getting less of what I want.
But there are two problems. First, contrary to the thought just mentioned, some
all-things-considered defective desires are not obviously more authentic or more
reflective of my true self than desires which are not defective. Suppose I am deliberating
about whether to stay at my current job or take a new job in another city. Staying would
satisfy (or allow for the satisfaction of) many desires I have and frustrate others, whereas
leaving would satisfy many other desires I have, but also frustrate many of my desire. As
it turns out, taking the new job would, on balance, satisfy (or allow for the satisfaction of)
one additional desire. This would make my desire to stay in my current job inauthentic—
not a reflection of my true self. But surely that desire is at least in some important way
reflective of my true self.
Perhaps Heathwood’s authenticity must require that, for a desire to be inauthentic,
satisfying it must lead to much more desire frustration, on balance, than not satisfying it.
Put another way, an inauthentic desire is one which is incompatible with the satisfaction
of the vast majority of my other desires. This seems more plausible.
However, the second problem is that, in the desire replacement case, it is part of
the case that replacement will result in more overall desire satisfaction than not
switching. We can add that it will result in vastly more desire satisfaction. It is hard to
see how the new desires will be in conflict with many of one’s other desires. So
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Heathwood’s conception of authenticity would seem to have the result that the
replacement desires are authentic. But this is a strange conception of authenticity.
It might be replied that the desires which would result from treatment are not your
desires, and so do not figure into the calculation of desire satisfaction. It might even be
replied that the new desires that result from treatment are inauthentic because they
conflict with the satisfaction of your pre-treatment desires. But this reply fails because it
seems to presuppose that the post-treatment desires are inauthentic. Why else should we
say they are not your desires? If your post-treatment desires are authentic, then it doesn’t
matter if they conflict with the satisfaction of your pre-treatment desires, as long as they
do not conflict with most of your post-treatment desires. Obviously, we cannot
presuppose that your post-treatment desires are inauthentic in order to show they are
inauthentic.

3.6.3 Additional reasons to accept the authenticity view
a. Importance of autonomy. Haji and Coopers suggest that we should think
desires must be authentic for their satisfaction to be good for you for the same reason that
we think only actions which are the result of authentic desires can be praiseworthy or
blameworthy. They do not say much more about the nature of this reason, however,
except to suggest that it would be surprising if it were not the same reason (“If acting on
[an inauthentic] desire fails to reveal the ‘quality of your will’, or fails to support your
being deserving of pleasure, why should its satisfaction be thought to contribute to your
wellbeing?”).77
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I think a possible way of defending the authentic desire theory is to develop the
analogy suggested by Haji and Coopers. What makes autonomy worth respecting has
something to do with the value of an individual’s ability to weigh reasons and make
evaluative judgments—in short, their perspective. Those judgments are worth respecting
when they are authentic. What makes them authentic is that they are the result of
reflection and deliberation.
The anti-paternalism argument against objectivist theories says that a good theory
of well-being should give an individual a say in what is good for them. In this argument,
paternalism appeared to be only a metaphor because paternalism involves forcing an
individual to do what is good for them, and the anti-paternalism argument is not saying
that objectivist theories restrict or even lead to the restriction of the freedom of
individuals. Such theories do something similar to paternalism, however, which is to fail
to respect an individual’s perspective. This does not mean that the objectivist theory
itself performs any action, but the theory fails as a theory of well-being because,
according to the objection, when picking out what is good for a person, the objectivist
theory ignores the importance of a person’s perspective.
For a non-authentic desire theory, the failure to respect an individual’s perspective
simply amounts to a failure to recognize the intrinsic prudential value of getting what you
want. But recognizing the value of getting what you want is compatible with failing to
respect a person’s perspective in a deeper way. As we have seen, on this version of the
desire theory, radical replacement of a person’s set of desires is good for a person so long
as it leads to a greater number of desire satisfactions. But this does not always seem to
make a person better off.
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To see more clearly how desire replacement might conflict with a person’s
perspective, consider a conflict between a person’s desires. Suppose I desire to spend the
day drinking, but I also desire to spend the day with my family. Suppose further that the
second desire is authentic, whereas the first is not. Perhaps this is because the first desire
is a desire which is beyond my control due to an addiction, or because I have a higher
order desire that the second desire be satisfied and not the first. Doesn’t it seem that, in
virtue of the fact that the second desire is authentic and not the first, that it would be
better for me if the second desire were satisfied than the first? Of course, if we are
inclined to say “yes,” this could be because we think it is generally better for people to be
with their family than to drink. So suppose instead that the conflict is between my desire
to spend the day with person A and my desire to spend the day with person B. Again, the
first desire is inauthentic, perhaps because the result of brainwashing or coercion, or
because of a higher order desire. It still may seem that satisfying the second desire is
better for me than the first.
Another consideration in favor of thinking that the satisfaction of inauthentic
desires is not as good for a person as the satisfaction of authentic desires is that
brainwashing seems bad for a person. It seems bad for a person even when the person
who is brainwashed is getting everything that they want. Leaving a cult seems good for
people in most cases, and it is not clear that the reason is that people come to have a
greater number of desire satisfactions as a result, nor do their desires become stronger.
The reason it is good for a person to leave a cult is that the person comes to have their
own beliefs and desires.
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b. Justifying the information requirement. As discussed in Chapter 2, a popular
version of the desire theory says that only the satisfaction of desires you would have, or
would want yourself to have, if properly informed are good for you. There are different
ways to explain why it is more valuable to satisfy informed desires than uninformed
desires. There are two often cited arguments in favor of the informed desire theory. The
first argument begins by pointing out that the satisfaction of uninformed desires is
sometimes disappointing. Part of being disappointed by getting what you want is not
finding it attractive, and the resonance constraint discussed in Chapter 1 requires that an
object of desire be attractive to a person in order for it to be good for them. The informed
desire theory avoids saying that these disappointing desire satisfactions are good for you,
and so avoids violating the resonance constraint.
The second argument says that sometimes people are ignorant of an option that
they would find attractive if they were made aware of it. This motivation for the
informed desire view has not to do with preventing disappointment, but with creating
new desire satisfactions. The thought is, if the only explanation for why a person lacks a
desire for some option is that they are unaware of that option or unaware of what taking
that option would be like, then even though they do not happen to desire it, it would be
good for them. But why is it good for them? One answer is that it is an additional desire
satisfaction. But information can sometimes replace uninformed desires with new,
informed ones.
Consider the way that liberal arts education affects a person’s desires. A benefit
of a liberal arts education is that, through a greater exposure to new ideas and ways of
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life, a person comes to have a more developed perspective on the world and their place in
it, and a better idea of what they want to do. This seems good for them because their new
desires are more informed. But it may not be that they have more desires, or more desire
satisfactions, as a result. Even if they do, there seems to be a unique benefit they get
from having their desires cultivated through a liberal arts education. In virtue of being
produced in this way, the desires of such a person appear to have a better claim to being
their real desires than the desires they would have had had they had no education at all.
How else can we explain this benefit except by appealing to the notion of authenticity?
The new, informed desires they have are more authentic. This may be the right way to
describe the effect on desire, not just of formal education, but personal growth in general.
In short, the view that the satisfaction of authentic desires counts for more may be a
necessary part of the justification for an informed desire theory.

3.7. Problems for the Authentic Desire Theory
While there are many advantages of the authentic desire theory, the theory also
faces a number of problems. I now turn to considering just a few of those problems.

a. No clear account of authenticity. There are also problems for the authentic
desire theory, however. One problem involves providing a clear account of what makes a
desire count as authentic. Providing a clear account is important, not only for allowing us
to accurately determine how well-off a person is, but also because without this, we cannot
be entirely certain that the authentic desire view avoids the problem of desire
replacement.
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While providing a clear account of authentic desire is no doubt difficult, we
should not assume it to be impossible, and so this problem for the view may not be a fatal
one. Further, while the plausibility of the authentic desire theory may depend on the
details of this account, this does not mean we cannot take some steps in evaluating the
authentic desire theory without having such an account in hand. We can rely on a
common sense idea of the authenticity of a desire.

b. Ad hoc. Another more serious problem is that the authentic desire view needs
to be properly motivated in order to avoid the charge that it is an ad hoc addition to the
desire theory. Aside from getting the right result in the desire switching described above,
I have discussed a number of other reasons to find the view attractive. But there is a
special kind of motivation required by subjectivists for any kind of restriction on what
counts as good for a person. Subjectivists want to avoid restrictions on what counts as
good for a person which cannot be explained by the original motivations for subjectivism.
Such original motivations have to do with giving pride of place to an individual’s own
perspective in determining what is good for them. To say of someone that some of their
desires are irrelevant to what is good for them will appear objectivist unless there is an
explanation for why those desires are in some way not part of that person’s own
perspective. For example, an requirement that desires be “informed and rational” in
order for their satisfaction to be good for a person can be justified on subjectivist grounds
because, the reasoning goes, informed and rational desires more accurately represent
what a person really wants. To give satisfy an uninformed desire can sometimes be to
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give a person what they do not really want. The proponent of the authentic desire view
owes us some similar story to justify the restriction to only authentic desires.

c. Counterexamples. Another problem for the authentic desire view is that some
cases appear to support thinking that the satisfaction of seemingly inauthentic desires can
be good for a person. The force of this problem is easier to see when we consider cases
of desire frustration. If the satisfaction of authentic desires contributes more to wellbeing than inauthentic desires, it would seem to follow that the frustration of authentic
desires detracts more from well-being than inauthentic desires. But this seems
implausible. Consider a young man who, as a result of brain damage from a car accident,
now has a strong, abiding desire to become a quarterback of his high school football
team. Prior to the accident, the young man hated, not just football, but sports in general.
This new desire to become quarterback is just as inauthentic as the desires in the
replacement case, it would appear. Nevertheless, he has this desire now. So strong is his
desire that his life is more or less oriented around trying to become quarterback. He
practices and tries out for the team. But because of his small body, and poor hand-eye
coordination, he is told by the coach that he did not make the cut, and will likely never
make the cut. This desire frustration seems bad for him. But does it seem less bad for
him than for a young man who is in exactly the same situation, but whose desire to be
quarterback was not produced artificially? It might seem that they are equally harmed by
what the coach tells them. 78
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I owe the details of this example to Fred Feldman. For a defense of a sort of authenticity constraint, see
Wayne Sumner, Welfare Happiness and Ethics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 156-170. For
arguments against a similar authenticity constraint on hedonism, see Fred Feldman, What is this Thing
Called Happiness? (New York: Oxford University Press): 188-203.
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Consider also a person who has been severely depressed most of their adult life,
so that their depressed desires count as authentic. The desires they get as a result of
treatment--desires to have friends, have a successful career, and to be in love--are
therefore inauthentic. At least, they are inauthentic initially following treatment. Do we
really want to say that the satisfaction of such a person's desires is less good for them
than the satisfaction of those same desires in someone who was not formerly depressed
(meaning that their desires are authentic)? It might seem strange to say that in either
case--the high school student or the depressed person--that authenticity has an effect on
the value of the desire satisfaction or frustration.
The case of depression is, I think, an even more damaging counterexample. This
case is what motivates the original problem this work set out to solve. Premise (4) of that
argument said

4.

But there are things which could make [the depressed person] better off

than they are.

If the desire theory says only desire satisfactions can make a person better off, and
it also says that inauthentic desire satisfactions are not valuable, then (4) can only be true
if the desires the depressed person would have if not depressed were authentic. But
arguably, treatments for depression do not always produce desires which are authentic, at
least in some cases. This is because some treatments for depression, like drug therapy or
electroconvulsive therapy, have their anti-depressant effect through direct manipulation
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of a person’s brain. Such a treatment would be expected to produce desires which are no
more authentic than those produced by the desire replacement therapy.
One might respond that anti-depressant treatment only serves to restore one’s
desires, instead of producing new, inauthentic ones. It is true that treatment often leads
people to begin caring about the things that they used to care about. But some cases of
depression last for many years, and in such cases, it is less clear that the desires produced
by treatment are ones that person had before.79
These considerations might also push us to reconsider our intuition that the desire
replacement treatment is prudentially bad. If what makes desire replacement seem bad is
that it results in inauthentic desires, but the authenticity of a desire has no bearing on how
much its satisfaction contributes to well-being, then we should give up thinking desire
replacement is bad.

3.8. Where this leaves the desire theory
The aim of this work was to explore solutions to the problem of depression for the
desire theory. I argued in Chapter 2 that standard versions of the desire theory do not
have the resources to reply to the problem of depression. In order to avoid the problem,
the desire theory must be revised or made more precise in some non-standard way. The
present chapter considered several ways of doing this. First, an attempt was made to
solve the problem by appealing to the distinction between object and combo views about
what has prudential value, but this distinction proved to be a red herring. The second
attempted solution was to appeal to the distinction between the fraction view and the
integer view as ways of measuring well-being on a desire theory. We saw that the
79

See footnote 35 for more on these cases.
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fraction view appeared to allow no way to represent the difference in well-being between
the depressed person and the non-depressed person (as represented by A and B), but the
integer view did allow the difference to be represented. But this only showed that
accepting the integer view was necessary but not sufficient for solving the problem of
depression.
Finally, we considered the distinction between the value of actual desire
satisfactions and possible desire satisfactions. I claimed at the end of Section 3.5 that I
saw no way for the actual desires view to solve the problem of depression, and focused
on the possible desires view. The possible desires view seems better able to explain why
the depressed person could be better off because it allows desires the depressed person
could have to be relevant to how well off they are. But allowing possible desires to be
relevant (together with the integer view about measurement) leads to the problem of
desire replacement: the unintuitive result that we would make you better off by
surgically implanting desires in such a way that you get more overall desire satisfaction.
The lesson of the desire replacement case seemed to be that allowing all desires
one could have to be relevant to their well-being violates the anti-paternalism
constraint—something which is supposed to be an advantage of desire theories over
competing theories. The most promising solution to the problem seemed to be to restrict
the desire satisfactions that are considered prudentially good to those that involve
authentic desires. While the resulting view seems to get the right result in the desire
replacement case (because the replacement treatment desires are inauthentic), it also fails
to solve the original problem of depression (because the anti-depressant treatment desires
are plausibly sometimes just as inauthentic).
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While there are many other reasons to find the authentic desire theory attractive, it
does not seem attractive enough to justify biting the bullet on the problem of depression.
I was originally motivated to try to solve the problem of depression for the desire theory
because it seemed to me to be the most serious problem the theory faced. As a result of
having worked in a clinical setting with people who were severely depressed, and from
my own experience with depression, a sort of keystone in my thinking about well-being
is that a severely depressed person is not well-off and would be better off if not
depressed, and any adequate theory of well-being ought to be able to explain this fact.
One reaction to this apparent inability of a single version of the desire theory to
avoid both the problem of depression and the problem of desire replacement is to give up
on the desire theory. An objective list theorist, hedonist or hybrid theorist has an easier
time explaining why the depressed person is not well-off. They can say that the
depressed person is badly off because their life is lacking friendship or pleasure, for
example.
But I believe there are avenues that remain open to the desire theorist to solving
both problems. One avenue involves arguing that the desire replacement treatment case,
as it was presented in this chapter, is under-described, and that once we see what is
involved and what effect it would have on a person, we would be more inclined to opt for
it—or, at least, more inclined to think we ought to opt for it for our own good—even
though the desires that would result would be inauthentic. It is hard to see how taking
this avenue would avoid giving up on the anti-paternalism constraint, but this might be a
necessary sacrifice.80 A second avenue involves further exploration of what it takes for a
desire to count as authentic. Perhaps it will turn out, on the right theory of authenticity of
80

In conversation, Heathwood endorsed this response.
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desire, that desire replacement treatment produces inauthentic desires but anti-depressant
treatment does not.
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